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It is striking that Rufus W. Peckham has received so little
scholarly attention and remains without a biography.1 He was, of
*

Milton R. Underwood Professor of Law and Professor of History, Vanderbilt University.

I wish to acknowledge the skillful assistance of Stephen Jordan and James Kelly of the Massey
Law Library of Vanderbilt University. I wish to thank David E. Bernstein, Jon W. Bruce,
Richard A. Epstein, Gideon Kanner, Brian Z. Tamanaha, and Ellen Frankel Paul for helpful
suggestions on an earlier version of this Article. I am especially grateful to Virginia Elizabeth
Worthy for her helpful research assistance.
See generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE FULLER COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND LEGACY
1.
69-73 (2003) (giving a short sketch of Peckham's life and judicial service); Megan W. Benett,
Rufus Wheeler Peckham, Jr., in THE JUDGES OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS: A
BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY 233, 233-38 (Albert M. Rosenblatt ed., 2007) (same); Scott Horton, Rufus
Wheeler Peckham, Jr., in BIOGRAPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME COURT 395, 395-98
(Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 2006) (same); Richard Skolnik, Rufus Peckham, in 3 THE JUSTICES OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 806, 833-52 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., Chelsea
House Publishers, 3d ed. 1997) (same); see also William F. Duker, Mr. Justice Rufus W.
Peckham: The Police Power and the Individual in a Changing World, 1980 BYU L. REV. 47, 4767 (reviewing Peckham's liberty of contract and antitrust decisions); Robert L. Lasky, Rufus
Wheeler Peckham: His Life and Times (Apr. 11, 1951) (unpublished A.B. thesis, Harvard
University) (on file with author); Paul Mandelstam, Rufus W. Peckham, His Career and His
Influence (1944) (unpublished A.B. thesis, Harvard University) (on file with author). One
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course, the author of Lochner v. New York (1905),2 one of the most
famous and contested decisions in the history of the Supreme Court.
Moreover, Peckham wrote important opinions dealing with
contractual freedom, antitrust law, eminent domain, dormant
commerce power, and the Eleventh Amendment. Indeed, Owen M.
Fiss maintains that Peckham and David J. Brewer were intellectual
leaders of the Fuller Court, "influential within the dominant coalition
and the source of the ideas that gave the Court its sweep and
direction." Even when they did not prevail, Fiss observed, Peckham
3
and Brewer "set the terms for the debate."
Why has such an influential jurist been so conspicuously
overlooked in the historical literature? One might be tempted to
explain this neglect in terms of the disdain that many scholars feel
toward the jurisprudence of the Gilded Age, with its emphasis on
economic liberty and limited government. It is an old adage that
winners write history. Scholars who view the work of the Supreme
Court through the lens of the Progressive and New Deal mindset
would likely have little sympathy for Peckham. 4 After all, he was
skeptical about much of the legislation associated with the Progressive
movement and strenuously rejected the emerging statist liberalism.
While no doubt this is a partial explanation, it is not ultimately
persuasive.
Other leading jurists of the late nineteenth
century-Stephen J. Field, 5 Melville W. Fuller,6 Brewer, 7 Thomas M.
Cooley 8-have received considerable scholarly attention. Even the
controversial Lochner decision has been the subject of revisionist and

possible reason for scholarly neglect of Peckham could be the lack of primary research
documents. Peckham left no cache of revealing personal papers casting light on his judicial
career.
2.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
3.

OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 33 (1993)

(discussing the prominent influence both Peckham and Brewer had on the Fuller Court).
4.
Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Bogus Tale About the Legal Formalists81-82 (St. John's Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 08-0130, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.conmsol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=l123498 ("The day was won by the welfare state, and histories written by
progressives denigrated the vanquished opponents.").
5.
See generally PAUL KENS, JUSTICE STEPHEN FIELD: SHAPING LIBERTY FROM THE GOLD
RUSH TO THE GILDED AGE (1997).
6.

See generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER,

1888-1910 (1995).
7.
See generally MICHAEL J. BRODHEAD, DAVID J. BREWER: THE LIFE OF A SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE, 1837-1910 (1994).
8.
See generally ALAN R. JONES, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
MCINTYRE COOLEY: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1987).
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more sympathetic accounts in recent years. 9 So we are left with an
unresolved question as to why Justice Peckham lingers in relative
obscurity. I propose in this Article to take a fresh look at Peckham's
career and assess his contributions to constitutional jurisprudence.
I. BACKGROUND

Born in 1838 in Albany, New York, Peckham was part of a
family of prominent lawyers and judges. Indeed, in many respects
Peckham's early career followed his father's path. The elder Peckham
was a district attorney, a member of Congress, and served on both the
New York Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. 10 Rufus Peckham
was educated locally and studied law in his father's office. He was
admitted to the New York bar in 1859. Joining the family firm,
Peckham built a successful practice representing the Albany and
Susquehanna Railroad, a local bank, and real estate interests.1 1 As
the sectional crisis worsened on the eve of the Civil War, Peckham
expressed no sympathy for abolitionism or racial equality. "I am proud
I believe in no negro equality" he wrote to his brother in late 1860.12
Two years later Peckham favored vigorous prosecution of the Civil
War to preserve the Union but also respect for the rights of the South
under the Constitution. He worried that "the radical abolitionists"
were "making it a war for the freedom of the slaves, in spite of the
Constitution and if necessary in spite of the Union." 13 As might be
expected given his views, Peckham did not serve in the military.

9.
See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 211-14 (2004) (explaining the reasoning behind the Lochner decision); RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT: HOW TO REVIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE
PROPERTY 165-66 (2008) (highlighting the benefit of Lochner on labor market competition);
Hadley Arkes, Lochner v. New York and the Cast of Our Laws, in GREAT CASES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 94, 94-129 (Robert P. George ed., 2000) (analyzing the importance of
Lochner); David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of
Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 42-51 (2003) (discussing the so-called
Lochner era); Ellen Frankel Paul, Freedom of Contractand the "PoliticalEconomy" of Lochner v.
New York, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 515, 519-61 (2005) (unraveling Justice Holmes's criticism of
Lochner); Bernard H. Siegan, RehabilitatingLochner, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 453, 453-97 (1985)
(justifying the Lochner decision).
10. Lasky, supra note 1, at 33-38.
11. Id. at 38-46.
12. Letter from Rufus Peckham to Wheeler Peckham (Nov. 1860) (on file with the
Vanderbilt Law Review and with the Library of Congress, Papers of Wheeler H. Peckham
Family, vol. 2, box 1, folder 22).
13. Letter from Rufus Peckham to Wheeler Peckham (Oct. 29, 1862) (on file with the
Vanderbilt Law Review and with the Library of Congress, Wheeler H. Peckham Family Papers,
vol. 2, box 1, folder 28).
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Peckham was active in Democratic Party affairs, and in 1868
he was elected district attorney for Albany County, a post that he held
for three years. From 1881 to 1883 he was corporation counsel for the
City of Albany. Participating regularly in Democratic Party
conventions at both the national and state level, Peckham emerged as
a leading spokesman for upstate Democrats in their struggle to
prevent domination of the party by Tammany Hall. He formed a close
friendship with Grover Cleveland and actively supported Cleveland's
rise in New York political life. In 1883, Peckham was elected to the
New York Supreme Court. Three years later, then-President
Cleveland helped to engineer Peckham's election to the New York
14
Court of Appeals.
II. COURT OF APPEALS
During his nearly ten years on the New York appellate bench
Peckham proved to be an able judge who avoided partisanship. He
authored more than 300 opinions for the court on a wide variety of
private law topics, including property, torts, contracts, and wills.
Peckham wrote only eight dissenting opinions, but he dissented more
than eighty times without opinion. Most interesting for our purposes,
however, are Peckham's opinions raising constitutional issues. He
demonstrated skepticism about governmental regulation of the
economy, an aversion to class legislation, and a disposition to define
liberty as encompassing economic freedom. Because Peckham carried
these views with him to the Supreme Court, his work on the Court of
Appeals warrants careful consideration.
Peckham's opinion in People v. Gillson (1888) is especially
revealing. 15 At issue was the defendant's act of giving away a teacup
and saucer to the purchaser of two pounds of coffee as part of a
promotional scheme. The state alleged that this transaction violated a
section of the penal code that banned the distribution of gifts or prizes
with the sale of food. It argued that the measure was a valid exercise
of the police power to prohibit lotteries and prevent the sale of
unwholesome food. Speaking for a unanimous bench, Peckham found
that the statute amounted to a deprivation of both liberty and
property without due process of law as guaranteed by the New York
Constitution. Emphasizing that liberty encompassed the right "to earn
his livelihood in any lawful calling and to pursue any lawful trade or
avocation," he pictured the statute as an anticompetitive regulation. It
14.
15.

Lasky, supra note 1, at 46-56.
17 N.E. 343 (N.Y. 1888).
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was, Peckham complained, "of that kind which has been so frequent of
late, a kind which is meant to protect some class in the community
against the fair, free and full competition of some other class .... "16
He insisted that the statute infringed upon the owner's liberty to
pursue a lawful calling and deprived him of property by curtailing the.
power of sale. After considering at length the state's police power
argument, Peckham concluded that there was no element of chance,
here and hence no lottery. Although conceding that the legislature
could ban lotteries and prevent the sale of adulterated food, he
declared that the statute did not accomplish either purpose.
Peckham's Gillson opinion anticipates much of his reasoning in
Lochner. He broadly defined liberty to include economic activities and
required the state to demonstrate that its exercise of regulatory
17
authority was "reasonably necessary for the common welfare."
Peckham did not accept the state's ostensible purpose at face value.
Instead, he undertook an extensive economic analysis of the
regulation and independently weighed the evidence, finding that the
measure had no relationship to its alleged purpose. Thus, Peckham
persuasively ruled that on the facts presented, the state failed to
justify its interference with liberty and property. Moreover, the
Gillson opinion underscores Peckham's intellectual debt to Jacksonian
Democracy, with its stress on equal rights and distrust of class
legislation. The Jacksonian distaste for granting special economic
privilege and preference for competition had a significant impact on
18
constitutional thought in the Gilded Age.
It bears emphasis that Peckham's solicitude for economic
liberty was not confined to business enterprises. He championed the
right to pursue ordinary trades, a right seemingly threatened by the
rise of occupational licensing in the late nineteenth century.
Accordingly, Peckham viewed occupational licensing with deep
skepticism. In Nechameus v. Warden of the City Prison (1895) the
court majority upheld a state law that required master plumbersthose who employed other plumbers to work for them-to pass an
examination and obtain a license from a board of plumbers.1 9 The

16.
17.

Id. at 345.
Id. at 346.

18.

HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER

ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 33-60 (1993) (noting the continuing importance of
Jacksonian doctrines in shaping judicial support for free markets); Michael Les Benedict,
Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 793, 318-20, 327-31 (1985) (stressing the significance of
Jacksonian hostility to class legislation).
19. 39 N.E. 686 (N.Y. 1895).
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majority reasoned that the statute, although coming "pretty close" to
the borderline of legitimate police power, related to public health and
welfare. In a vigorous dissent, however, Peckham blasted the
licensure scheme as a deprivation of the liberty to follow an ordinary
trade. Finding no health or safety rationale for the act, he declared:
"[I]t would seem quite apparent that its purpose is to enable the
employing plumbers to create a sort of guild or body among
themselves, into which none is to be permitted to enter excepting as
he may pass an examination, the requisites of which are not
stated.... ." Peckham added that the license requirement was "vicious
in its purpose and that it tends directly to the creation and fostering of
20
a monopoly."
Peckham's commitment to economic rights was also manifest in
his dissenting opinion in a pair of cases concerning the power of the
state to set maximum charges for grain elevators. The power of state
governments to impose rates on railroads and allied industries was
much contested in the Gilded Age. Peckham vigorously disagreed with
the court majority, which sustained the state's ratemaking
authority. 2 1 Recognizing that the state could protect the public health
and morals, he insisted that "a power to limit compensation is another
and far greater and more dangerous power."22 Peckham rejected the
reasoning of the Supreme Court in Munn v. Illinois (1877), which held
that states could prescribe rates for businesses "clothed with a public
interest."23 In his view, the state's authority to fix charges was
confined to exceptional situations such as common carriers and those
enterprises that had a privilege granted by government. Peckham
flatly rejected the contention that the grain elevators in question
24
amounted to a "virtual monopoly" which justified price regulation.
He stressed that other individuals were free to go into the same
business. 25 Peckham proclaimed "the general rule of absolute liberty of

20. Id. at 691 (Peckham, J., dissenting).
21. People v. Budd, 22 N.E. 670 (N.Y. 1889).
22. Id. at 682 (Peckham, J., dissenting). Peckham was apparently the first American judge
to use the phrase "liberty of contract" in a constitutional context. Id. I am indebted to David E.
Bernstein for calling this point to my attention. Peckham evidently prepared this dissenting
opinion for the companion case of People v. Walsh, 22 N.E. 1127 (N.Y. 1889), which presented the
same issues. But the court rendered no written opinion in Walsh and Peckham's dissent was
published in connection with Budd. The Budd decision by the New York Court of Appeals was
affirmed by the Supreme Court by a vote of six to three. Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517 (1892).
Justice David J. Brewer's dissenting opinion, however, closely followed the analysis proposed by
Peckham. Id. at 548-52 (Brewer, J., dissenting).
23. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877).
24. Budd, 22 N.E. at 684, 689.
25. Id.

20091

RUFUS W PECKHAM

the individual to contract regarding his own property," a doctrine that
would be a hallmark of his jurisprudence. Further, Peckham renewed
his warning against the evil of class legislation:
To uphold legislation of this character is to provide the most frequent opportunity for
arraying class against class, and in addition to the ordinary competition that exists
throughout all industries, a new competition will be introduced, that of competition for
the possession of the government, so that legislative aid may be given to the class in
possession thereof in its contests with rival classes or interests .... 26

In addition to business regulations, Peckham wrestled with
fledgling land use controls in a number of cases. He maintained that
courts should carefully scrutinize such legislation, but was prepared to
uphold those controls that imposed reasonable burdens and clearly
preserved public health and safety. At the same time, he disapproved
of land use controls that effectively deprived an owner of the beneficial
enjoyment of his or her property.
Peckham's approach to land use issues was well illustrated by
Health Departmentof New York v. Rector of Trinity Church (1895).27 A
state law required the owner of tenement houses in New York City to
furnish a supply of water to tenants on each floor. The Health
Department sued the owner to recover a fine for failure to comply.
Writing for the court, Peckham rejected the defendant's argument
that the legislation amounted to a deprivation of property without due
process of law. He began by asserting that an exercise of the police
power must "tend in a degree that is perceptible and clear" toward the
health and welfare of the public. Nor would Peckham accept the
ostensible purpose of legislation blindly. Rather, he declared that
courts must look at "the true character of the act" to ascertain if it was
passed for an object within the police power or "for a distinct and
' 28
totally different purpose.
Having preserved far-reaching judicial scrutiny of regulations,
Peckham stated that the legislature could not command the
expenditure of an unreasonable amount of money by landowners, but
reasonable exactions could pass judicial muster. Peckham explained:
We may own our property absolutely and yet it is subject to the proper exercise of the
police power. We have surrendered to that extent our right to its unrestricted use. It
must be so used as not improperly to cause harm to our neighbor, including in that
description the public generally ....
The legislature, in the exercise of this power, may
direct that certain improvements may be made in existing houses at the owners'

26. Id. at 694. For an insightful analysis of Peckham's dissent in Budd, see Alan J. Meese,
Liberty and Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1, 29-34 (1999).
27. 39 N.E. 833 (N.Y. 1895).
28. Id. at 835.
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expense, so that 29the health and safety of the occupants and of the public through them
may be guarded.

Hence, the fact that the regulation entailed some expense to the owner
did not constitute a deprivation of property. In this connection,
Peckham noted that laws regulating manufacturing plants or
governing building projects in urban areas also cause increased
expense. Expressing sympathy with legislative efforts to improve
tenement living conditions, Peckham found that the legislation was a
valid exercise of the police power to safeguard the health and safety of
the public.
Yet Peckham had no hesitancy to strike down land use controls
that lacked a compelling justification or imposed an unduly severe
burden on landowners. In Forster v. Scott (1893), the court heard a
challenge to the practice of mapping certain urban lots for possible
future acquisition by local government. 30 A statute provided that no
compensation would be paid for any building erected on these lots
subsequent to filing such a map. The purpose of this measure was to
hold down the cost of obtaining those parcels should local government
eventually decide to do so. As a practical matter, it severely restricted
the right to use or dispose of land. The plaintiff, owner of a vacant lot
in New York City, argued that his lot was primarily valuable for
building purposes, but that because of the mapping regulation, the lot
could not be used except at risk to the owner of losing the cost of any
building. Peckham joined a unanimous court in declaring the
regulation void as to the plaintiff:
What the legislature cannot do directly, it cannot do indirectly, as the Constitution
guards as effectually against insidious approaches as an open and direct attack.
Whenever a law deprives the owner of the beneficial use and free enjoyment of his
property, or imposes restraints upon such use and enjoyment, that materially affect its
value, without legal process or compensation, it deprives him of his property within the
meaning of the Constitution. All that is beneficial in property arises from its use and the
fruits of that use, and whatever deprives a person of them deprives him of all that is
desirable or valuable in the title and possession. It is not necessary, in order to render a
statute obnoxious to the restraints of the Constitution, that it must in terms or in effect
authorize an actual physical taking of the property or the thing itself, so long as3 1it
affects its free use and enjoyment, or the power of disposition at the will of the owner.

The court not only defined the right of property ownership broadly to
include use, but its analysis made clear that future developmental
rights were entitled to constitutional protection.
Questions pertaining to the exercise of eminent domain also
occupied Peckham's time. He sought to secure the right of owners to
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 836.
32 N.E. 976 (N.Y. 1893).
Id. at 977.
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receive compensation when their land was taken by the state. In Clark
v. Water Commissioners of Amsterdam (1895), the owner's land was
condemned to help provide a municipal water supply. 32 Inexplicably
the owner waited nearly ten years before initiating proceedings to
obtain compensation. Peckham, writing for a unanimous court,
brushed aside the city's argument that a statute of limitations
governing liabilities created by statute should be applied. Instead, he
maintained that payment of compensation for appropriated property
was a constitutional, not a statutory, obligation.
Another question arising in the eminent domain context
concerned the construction of elevated railroads in New York City,
which severely impacted land use and gave rise to prolonged
litigation. 33 Fearing loss of property value due to noise, smoke, and
vibration, adjacent landowners sought compensation for damages
caused by the operation of such railroads. In a line of decisions, the
Court of Appeals determined that abutting landowners held
easements of light, air, and access to public streets appurtenant to
their land. The elevated railroads were found to be liable for
interference with these easements by their structure or operation.
Peckham joined in numerous opinions awarding damages to adjacent
landowners. 34 But he also denied recovery for destruction of such
easements where the owners could not demonstrate a loss.
In Bohm v. Metropolitan Elevated Railway Co. (1892),3 5 he
grappled with the thorny question of how to ascertain the measure of
compensation for loss of light, air, and access easements when no land
of the claimants was taken for the railroads. Peckham revealingly
explained the court's larger concern with the diminution of property
values caused by the elevated railroad:
When the courts acquired possession of the question, and it was seen that abutting land,
which before the erection of the road, was worth, for instance, $10,000, might be reduced
to a half or a quarter of that sum in value, or even rendered practically worthless, by
reason of the building of the road, it became necessary to ascertain if there were not
some principle of law which could be resorted to in order to render those who wrought
such damages liable for their work. It has now been decided that, although the land
itself was not taken, yet the abutting owner, by reason of his situation, had a kind of

32. 42 N.E. 414 (N.Y. 1895).
33. See Elizabeth Arens, The Elevated Railroad Cases: Private Property and Mass Transit
in Gilded Age New York, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 629, 633-39 (2006).
34. See, e.g., Kane v. N.Y. Elevated R.R., 26 N.E. 278 (N.Y. 1891) (affirming landowner
damages); Abendroth v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 25 N.E. 496 (N.Y. 1890) (same); Porter v. Metro.
Elevated Ry. Co., 24 N.E. 454 (N.Y. 1890) (same).
35. 29 N.E. 802 (N.Y. 1892).
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property in the public street and for the
purpose of giving to such land facilities of light,
36
of air, and of access from such streets.

He noted the general rule that a condemning party must pay "the full
value of the land taken at its market value, and no deduction can be
made from that value for any purpose whatever. ' 37 Peckham
maintained, however, that light, air, and access easements were only
of nominal value in themselves. Their value therefore had to be
established by the loss inflicted on the adjoining land.
Peckham concluded that there had been no damage unless the
owner suffered a loss in market value to the remaining land by virtue
of the taking of the easements. If the evidence showed that the
property had actually increased in value, there could be no recovery.
In short, Peckham attempted to harmonize the interests of both
parties. "The rule," he declared, "permits a recovery by the abutting
owners of the full amount of the actual damages sustained by them,
while at the same time it will not permit such owners to recover, by
some theoretical or abstract mode of reasoning, alleged damages,
'38
which in plain truth they have never suffered.
Peckham also participated in several cases and wrote one
opinion that sought to define the concept of "public use" as a limitation
on the exercise of eminent domain. He was guided by several cardinal
principles. "Private property," he stressed, "cannot be taken for
private use against the will of its owner, even upon full compensation
being made. '39 According to Peckham, whether a taking of property
was for a "public use" was a judicial question. He further maintained
that the terms "public use" and "public interest" were not
synonymous. Peckham explained the difference:
There is... unquestionably a distinction between the use which is public and an
interest which is public, and where there is simply a public interest, as distinguished
from a public use, the right of eminent domain cannot be exercised. The interest may be
of a public nature when the use may tend incidentally to benefit the public in
some
40
collateral way. In such a case the right to take property in invitum does not exist.

There is no hint in Peckham's language that he would defer to
a legislative determination of what constitutes public use. Indeed, he
joined in two opinions that invalidated proposed takings of property
on grounds that the acquisition was essentially for private gain. 4 1 As
36. Id. at 804.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 807-08.
39. In re Application of the Mayor, 31 N.E. 1043, 1044 (N.Y. 1892).
40. Id.
41. In re Application of the Split Rock Cable Rd. Co., 28 N.E. 506 (N.Y. 1891); In re
Application of the Niagara Falls & Whirlpool Ry. Co., 15 N.E. 429 (N.Y. 1888).

2009]

RUFUS W PECKHAM

in other areas of law touching upon economic rights, Peckham was
prepared to make an independent assessment about the legitimacy of
governmental action. Yet he certainly did not shut the door on the
exercise of eminent domain. In Application of the Mayor (1892),
Peckham, writing for the court, upheld the authority of New York City
to condemn waterfront land for the construction of piers and
wharves. 42 He conceded that a "public use" was generally defined as a
use open to public resort and not dependent on the will of a private
party. Nonetheless, Peckham noted that the city was under a
legislative duty to provide adequate facilities for seaborne commerce.
He therefore reasoned that the taking of waterfront property was for a
"public use" even if some of the land might subsequently be leased for
the exclusive possession of steamship companies. "The use is public
while the property is thus leased," Peckham asserted, "because it fills
an undisputed necessity existing in regard to these common carriers
by water, who are themselves engaged in fulfilling their obligations to
43
the general public."
Not all of Peckham's noteworthy rulings on the Court of
Appeals were concerned with economic issues, Two of Peckham's
opinions dealing with election law illustrate important aspects of his
jurisprudence. In 1891, the court's majority held that, under the Ballot
Reform Act, some 1,250 defective ballots mistakenly distributed by
44
election officials could not lawfully be counted in a state senate race.
This decision had the result of depriving the Republican candidate of a
majority and awarding the seat to his Democratic opponent.
Peckham's vigorous dissent did much to establish his reputation as a
nonpartisan jurist. He pointed out that only qualified voters had
participated in the election, and that the ballots of innocent voters
were discarded without fault on their part. He charged that the
majority's action was a "gross injustice" that worked "a burlesque on
45
the Ballot Act and its construction."
More remarkable was Peckham's prescient concern for equity
in legislative apportionment. At issue in Baird v. Board of Supervisors
of the County of Kings (1893) was a challenge to assembly districts set
by the county supervisors. 46 There was considerable population
disparity among the districts. Writing for a unanimous court,
Peckham
asserted
judicial
supervision
of the
legislative

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Application of the Mayor, 31 N.E. at 1046.
Id.
Nichols v. Bd. of County Canvassers of Onondaga County, 29 N.E. 327 (N.Y. 1891).
Id. at 344 (Peckham, J., dissenting).
33 N.E. 827 (N.Y. 1893).
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apportionment process. Reviewing the principles governing the theory
of representation in New York, he proclaimed: "There were no
privileged classes among [citizens], no class which enjoyed special civil
rights, or immunities, and therefore, when representatives were to be
apportioned among the population represented, the fundamental and
natural idea was, in this state, that such apportionment should be
equal." 47 At that time, the New York Constitution did not expressly
mandate that assembly districts contain equal numbers of
inhabitants, but Peckham insisted that a requirement of equal
population districts could be implied from prior constitutional
language and the state's recognized policy. He agreed that perfect
equality of districts could not be attained, and that the board had
considerable discretion in formulating districts. Still, Peckham
observed that "a grave, palpable and unreasonable deviation from the
standard" would call for judicial redress. 48 He then struck down the
Kings County apportionment.
Peckham's expansive vision of the judicial role was also evident
in his dissenting opinion in Talcott v. City of Buffalo (1891).4 9 The case
turned upon the authority of a taxpayer to maintain an action against
the municipal governing body to prevent the substitution of electric
street lighting for the existing gas lighting. The majority construed
the statute authorizing taxpayer suits to cover only illegal or
dishonest acts by. municipal officials. It expressed concern that judicial
review of local government decisions would produce excessive
litigation and inconvenience, and the holding suggested that
taxpayers look to the political process for a remedy. Dissenting,
Peckham argued that the statute empowered courts to enjoin "a plain,
bald, useless waste of the property or funds of the public." 50 He
acknowledged that courts should not substitute their judgment for
that of local officials, but he was skeptical of effective political redress.
"The right, at some future time," Peckham concluded, "to elect other
officers in place of the reckless ones who have already wasted the
moneys of the public, affords no redress for the wrong already done,
and experience has shown that it has the very slightest deterrent
51
effect."
In contrast to his commitment to economic liberty and political
equity, Peckham demonstrated no interest in racial equality. At issue

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 829.
Id. at 833.
26 N.E. 263 (N.Y. 1891).
Id. at 265 (Peckham, J., dissenting).
Id.
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in People v. King (1888) was a New York statute outlawing
discrimination by owners of theaters and places of amusement for
reasons of race or color.5 2 Rejecting the contention that the measure
was an unconstitutional interference with the rights of property
owners, the court majority upheld it as a valid exercise of the police
power. Peckham and another judge, however, dissented without
opinion. They were likely bothered by the majority's characterization
of places of resort as quasi-public in nature, and thus subject to
regulation. This dissent foreshadowed similar behavior in civil rights
cases while Peckham was on the Supreme Court.
Nor did Peckham display much sympathy for the victims of
industrial accidents. He was prepared to invoke the common law
assumption of the risk defense, despite harsh consequences for injured
parties. For example, in Hickey v. Taaffe (1887), he concluded that a
fourteen-year-old girl, badly hurt by a machine in a laundry, was not
entitled to any recovery. 53 "[T]he plaintiff, in accepting this work and
entering upon the employment about this machine," Peckham
reasoned, "assumed the usual risks and perils of employment and
such as were incident to the use of this machine in its then condition,
so far as such risks were apparent." 54 He agreed that an employer
must give careful instruction to "a person of immature years" who was
put to work on dangerous machinery. But he insisted that the
evidence showed that the plaintiff was aware of the dangers inherent
in working the machine. Peckham described the assumption of the
55
risk doctrine as a "well settled and healthful" principle.
Public health regulations could also represent questions
relating to individual liberty. Periodic outbursts of smallpox in the
56
late nineteenth century posed significant public health issues.
Peckham joined a court opinion that restricted the power of local
officials to quarantine citizens in their homes unless they consented to
vaccination. 57 Granting a writ of habeas corpus, the court ruled that
there was no authority under the public health law to order a
quarantine unless "the parties were either infected with, or had been
actually exposed to, the disease of smallpox." 58 Stressing that a
N.E. 245 (N.Y. 1888).
N.E. 286 (N.Y. 1887).
at 289.
at 291.

52.
53.
54.
55.

18
12
Id.
Id.

56.

See JAMES

COLGROVE,

STATE

OF

IMMUNITY:

THE

POLITICS

OF VACCINATION

IN

TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 1-38 (2006) (discussing vaccination, public health, and legal
issues at the turn of the twentieth century).
57. In re Application of Smith, 40 N.E. 497 (N.Y. 1895).
58. Id. at 499.
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quarantine restrained both personal liberty and the right to pursue
lawful vocations, the court concluded that the health officials could not
isolate all persons who simply refused to be vaccinated. The opinion
concluded: "Like all enactments which may affect the liberty of
persons, this one must be strictly construed.. ....
-59 His vote in this
case anticipated Peckham's position when a similar issue reached the
Supreme Court years later.
III. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENT
Peckham's path to the Supreme Court provides a glimpse into
Gilded Age patronage politics. President Cleveland and Senator David
B. Hill were locked in a struggle over control of the New York
Democratic Party. In 1894, Cleveland nominated William B.
Hornblower, a leading New York City attorney, to fill a vacancy on the
Supreme Court. Hornblower had conducted an investigation into
judicial election irregularities and in so doing antagonized thenGovernor Hill. In retaliation, Hill successfully urged the Senate to
reject Hornblower's nomination. Cleveland then turned to Wheeler H.
Peckham, the brother of Rufus. A prominent advocate of legal reform,
Wheeler Peckham practiced in New York City and was not politically
active. Nonetheless, Senator Hill perceived a threat, and again he
invoked senatorial courtesy in persuading the Senate to vote against
confirmation. 60 At this time, however, Hill praised Rufus Peckham as
one who "would make a magnificent member of the Supreme Court." 61
Frustrated in finding an acceptable New York nominee, President
Cleveland named Edward Douglass White, a senator from Louisiana,
who was readily confirmed.
A year later there was another vacancy on the Court. Having at
last mended relations with Senator Hill, Cleveland named his close
friend Rufus Peckham as his final appointee to the Supreme Court in
December of 1895. The nomination was received enthusiastically. The
New York Times declared that Peckham "is admirably qualified for the
place by integrity, by learning, by judicial temperament, and by
judicial experience." 62 Hill endorsed the nomination, and Peckham
was confirmed only a few days later with no recorded opposition.
59. Id.
60. See Carl A. Pierce, A Vacancy on the Supreme Court: The Politics of Judicial
Appointment 1893-94, 39 TENN. L. REV. 555, 558-609 (1972) (explaining the political factors that
thwarted William Butler Hornblower's and Wheeler H. Peckham's Supreme Court nominations).
61. Wheeler H. Peckham Named: Nominated by the President for the Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 1894, at 1.
62. Judge Peckham, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1895, at 4.
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Peckham took his seat on the Court on January 6, 1896 and served for
fourteen years.
IV. THE FULLER COURT
The Framers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights believed
that respect for private property was closely linked to political
liberty. 6 3 Echoing this view, the federal courts were long concerned
with safeguarding property and contractual rights against legislative
abridgement. 64 In the late nineteenth century the Supreme Court,
under the leadership of Chief Justice Melville W. Fuller (1888-1910),
afforded heightened scrutiny to the rights of property owners in the
face of the nascent regulatory state. 65 Justice Stephen J. Field
cogently explained the guiding idea of the Court: "It should never be
forgotten that protection to property and to persons cannot be
separated. Where property is insecure, the rights of persons are
unsafe. Protection to the one goes with protection to the other; and
there can be neither prosperity nor progress where either is
66
uncertain."
Accordingly, before Peckham's appointment, the Fuller Court
had invoked a substantive reading of due process to establish judicial
review of state rate regulations, 6 7 strengthened the position of
68
property owners under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 69
struck down state laws that interfered with trade among the states,
70
invalidated the 1894 income tax as an unconstitutional "direct tax,"
and limited the reach of the Sherman Act of 1890.71
63.

See JAMES

W.

ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL

HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 43 (3d ed. 2008) (observing that the notion of property rights as
"essential for the enjoyment of liberty had long been a fundamental tenet of Anglo-American
constitutional thought"); Stuart Bruchey, The Impact of Concern for the Security of Property
Rights on the Legal System of the Early American Republic, 1980 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1136
(emphasizing the Founding Fathers' high regard for the security of property rights).
64. See generally ELY, supra note 63, at 42-105 (chronicling the evolution of property rights
from 1791 to the early 1900s).
65. See ELY, supra note 6, at 83-126 (discussing Chief Justice Fuller's Court).
66. Stephen J. Field, The Centenary of the Supreme Court (Feb. 4, 1890), reprinted in 134
U.S. 729, 745.
67. ELY, supra note 6, at 83-90.
68. See James W. Ely, Jr., The Fuller Court and Takings Jurisprudence,2 J. SuP. CT. HIST.
120-35 (1996) (focusing on the contribution of the Fuller Court to the development of Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause jurisprudence).
69. See ELY, supra note 6, at 140-48 (discussing Fuller Court cases invoking the dormant
commerce doctrine).
70. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), reconsidered and amended
by 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
71. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
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In many respects, therefore, Peckham joined a Supreme Court
on which the dominant outlook was congenial to his own convictions.
He helped to cement trends already evident on the Fuller Court, and
at the same time he moved the Court in some new directions.
Peckham wrote more than 300 majority opinions, but only seven
dissents. However, he dissented without opinion in 139 cases and
compiled a dissent rate of 4.9 percent. 72 Although Peckham was one of
the more prolific dissenters on the Fuller Court, his dissent rate is
quite low when compared to current dissent behavior.
V. LIBERTY OF CONTRACT

Peckham is closely associated with the liberty of contract
doctrine, and indeed he played a key role in the Court's somewhat
cautious endorsement of this principle. Americans of the nineteenth
century assigned a high value to contractual rights. 73 The law
generally left parties free to promote their own interests through
contractual arrangements. Exploring the origins of the liberty of
contract doctrine, which can be traced to several sources, is beyond the
scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that by the late nineteenth
century, state courts began to strike down some workplace regulations
as infringements of the constitutional right to enter agreements. 74 In
fact, the Supreme Court was relatively slow to adopt the liberty of
contract norm. That started to change with Peckham's landmark
75
opinion in Allgeyer v. Louisiana(1897).
In Allgeyer, Peckham, speaking for a unanimous Court, gave a
broad reading to the scope of "liberty" protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and for the first time embraced
freedom of contract as a constitutional principle. At issue in the case
was a state law that prohibited an individual within Louisiana from
entering an insurance contract with an out-of-state company not
72. SHELDON GOLDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND ESSAYS 87 tbl. 4.7 (2d ed. 1991)
(listing dissent rates of Justices on the Fuller Court); WILLARD L. KING, MELVILLE WESTON
FULLER: CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES 1888-1910 app. 1, at 341 (1950) (displaying data
on dissents without opinion).
73. James W. Ely, Jr., "To Pursue Any Lawful Trade or Avocation"- The Evolution of
Unenumerated Economic Rights in the Nineteenth Century, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 917, 947-48
(2006); David N. Mayer, The Myth of "Laissez-FaireConstitutionalism": Liberty of Contract
During the Lochner Era, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 217, 234-37 (2009).
74.

See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 25 (2002)

("[Tihere were important forerunners of Lochner on the state level. It was in the state supreme
courts that some important doctrines of constitutional law first saw the light of day-doctrines of
due process, or liberty of contract."); Ely, supra note 73, at 947-49 (discussing the rise of liberty
of contract).
75. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
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qualified to do business in Louisiana. Allgeyer, a Louisiana resident,
was convicted of notifying a New York insurance company of a
shipment of cotton covered by a marine insurance policy obtained in
New York. Peckham reversed the conviction and vigorously declared:
The liberty mentioned in that amendment means not only the right of the citizen to be
free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is
deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties;
to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that
essential to his
purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and
76
carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.

He then linked the freedom of contract to "the privilege of pursuing an
ordinary calling or trade and of acquiring, holding and selling
77
property."
Several comments are in order with respect to the outcome of
Allgeyer. Peckham did not bar any role for the states in governing
contractual freedom. He remarked that, pursuant to state police
power, contracts could be "regulated and sometimes prohibited" when
they conflicted with state policy articulated in a statute. 7 The Allgeyer
holding was also complicated by the fact that the challenged statute
79
had direct implications for business activity across state lines.
Peckham pointedly noted that state power did not extend to
prohibiting contracts made outside the jurisdiction.8 0 The Supreme
Court had long sought to guard the national market from state
interference,8 1 and Allgeyer must be partially seen in this light.
Finally, the Allgeyer case contradicts the misleading hypothesis
fashioned by the Progressives that the Supreme Court adopted the
liberty of contract principle to aid the propertied and business
76. Id. at 589.
77. Id. at 591.
78. Id.; see Mayer, supra note 73, at 259 (observing that "[t]he scope of the right protected
by liberty of contract was given its classic definition by Justice Peckham in Allgeyer v.
Louisiana,"but cautioning that "this liberty right was not unlimited").
79. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 178 (1991) ("The
legislature probably enacted the statute in Allgeyer to protect in-state insurance companies from
out-of-state competitors.").
80. See Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 591 (discussing the extrajurisdictional effects of the state law);
Michael G. Collins, October Term, 1896-EmbracingDue Process, 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 70, 8287 (2001) (suggesting that "the real problem in Allgeyer was that the regulation at issue
exceeded the permissible powers of the state, not that contractual freedom was somehow
generally immune from regulation").
81. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED
YEARS, 1789-1888, at 403-16 (1985) (discussing protection of interstate commerce from state
interference during the Waite era); JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF
FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 44, 50 (1956) (explaining the Court's
role in economic federalism and protection of national markets).
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interests.8 2 "The distributional effect of the decision," as Kermit L.
Hall and Peter Karsten have pointed out, "was hardly to protect the
rich from the poor, because the measure opened to citizens of the state
the opportunity to engage an effective competitor to insurance
83
companies within the state."
In any event, most of Peckham's colleagues did not share his
devotion to the liberty of contract doctrine. Despite the potentially
sweeping reach of the doctrine, the Supreme Court did not apply this
principle again for a number of years. In a series of cases, the Justices
rejected the contention that state laws regulating the terms and
conditions of employment abridged contractual liberty. Thus, the
Court upheld a state law limiting employment in mines to eight hours
a day,8 4 sustained a state law requiring employers to pay workers in
money not script,8 5 and validated a statute limiting hours of work on
state and municipal projects.88 So intense was Peckham's commitment
to liberty of contract that he dissented, albeit without opinion, in each
of these cases.
The Court was similarly reluctant to apply the liberty of
contract doctrine in cases involving regulation of business enterprise.
For example, it brushed aside a liberty of contract argument and
sustained a state mechanics' lien law.87 The Justices also held that
states could require grain elevators and warehouses on railroad lines
to obtain a license to do business.8 8 Peckham evidently had no quarrel
with these outcomes and did not dissent.
By 1905 it appeared at first blush that Peckham's dogged
efforts to fashion constitutional protection for contractual freedom
under due process had produced a meager result. The idea of a
constitutional right to make contracts free of state oversight
seemingly received little more than lip service from the Fuller Court.
82. See Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation and Origins of
Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293, 293-95 (1985) (describing the theory
that the era of laissez-faire constitutionalism was motivated by the desire to protect businesses
from government intervention); David E. Bernstein, Lochner and Revisionism, Revised: Lochner
and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalized, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 2-9 (2003)
(undermining the Progressive theory that Lochner era judges sought to impose their laissez-faire
views through their opinions).
83.

KERMIT L. HALL & PETER KARSTEN, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 257

(2d ed. 2009).
84. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898). For a discussion of Peckham's likely
thinking in Holden, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE
OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 123-24 (1993).

85.
86.
87.
88.

Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13, 22 (1901).
Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 224 (1903).
Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 193 U.S. 532, 550 (1904).
W.W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U.S. 452, 470 (1901).

2009]

RUFUS W. PECKHAM

609

Still, the Justices increasingly treated liberty of contract as a
constitutional baseline and expected the states to justify legislative
restrictions on this right. The freedom to make agreements could only
be curtailed to advance the health, safety, and morals of the
community.
Peckham's dedication to the liberty of contract eventually bore
fruit with his famous and much-maligned decision in Lochner v. New
York (1905).89 The case has been treated extensively elsewhere, so it
will receive just brief attention here. Lochner involved a challenge to a
state law that limited work in bakeries to ten hours a day or sixty
hours a week. Writing for a 5-4 majority, Peckham struck down the
measure as an infringement of contractual freedom. He maintained:
"The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is
part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution." 90 Peckham conceded that a
state could impose "reasonable conditions" on the enjoyment of both
liberty and property. He further agreed that the state could inspect
bakeries and enact measures to improve workplace conditions.
Peckham drew the line, however, at regulations governing working
hours. He was not persuaded that baking was an unhealthy trade, and
he could see no relationship between hours of work and the health of
bakers. Consequently, Peckham asserted that the "real object and
purpose" of the law was to regulate labor relations, not to achieve the
purported goal of safeguarding either public or employee health. 9 1 In
other words, he viewed the hours limitation as promoting a class
interest rather than a traditional police power concern with health
and safety. "It is impossible for us to shut our eyes," Peckham
lectured, "to the fact that many of the laws of this character, while
passed under what is claimed to be the police power for the purpose of
protecting the public health or welfare, are, in reality, passed from
other motives." 92 Declaring that bakers were capable of looking out for
their own interests, he characterized maximum-hours statutes as
"mere meddlesome interferences with the rights of the individual." 93

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Id. at 53.
Id. at 64.
Id.
Id. at 61.
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At first, the Lochner decision aroused little public interest. 9 4
Prominent figures in the Progressive Movement of the early twentieth
century, however, came to see the ruling as a barrier to their agenda
of legislative reform of working and social conditions.9 5 So notorious
did the decision eventually become that scholars have coined the
misleading phrase "Lochner era" to characterize an entire period of
Supreme Court history.
Among other problems, the notion of a Lochner era conveys an
erroneous impression of the Supreme Court's adherence to the liberty
of contract doctrine. 96 Judges of the supposed Lochner era, we are still
frequently told, sought to impose their laissez-faire ideology on the
polity. Revisionist scholarship has destroyed much of this once
conventional story. Many of the stock criticisms of Lochner are quite
wide of the mark. 9 7 It bears emphasis, moreover, that the Lochner
decision was atypical and was never steadily followed by the Supreme
Court. 98 Instead, the Court infrequently invoked the freedom of
contract principle and found that most regulatory legislation passed
constitutional muster. As Gregory S. Alexander cogently pointed out,
"even during the period between 1885 and 1930, the supposed height
of laissez-faire constitutionalism, the courts, federal and state, did not
uniformly sustain the liberty of contract principle."99
In fact, the Fuller Court only invoked the liberty of contract
doctrine in one additional case after Lochner while Peckham was on
the bench. In Adair v. United States (1908), Justice John Marshall
Harlan, writing for the majority, invalidated a congressional statute
that banned so-called yellow dog contracts on railroads.1 0 0 Such

94.

PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLITICS: THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER V. NEW

YORK 128 (1990) (observing that the "initial public reaction to the Court's ruling was very
subdued"). In fact, some commentators hailed the ruling. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner v.
New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469, 1502-03 (2005) (noting that some
commentators endorsed the ruling).
95. James W. Ely, Jr., The Protection of ContractualRights: A Tale of Two Constitutional
Provisions, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 370, 391-92 (2005) (questioning the existence of the
supposed Lochner era).
96.

Id.

97. See David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 373-86 (2003)
(asserting that standard attacks on Lochner for aggressive judicial review and enforcing rights
not found in the text of the Constitution are not persuasive in light of more recent
decisionmaking by the Supreme Court).
98. See HALL & KARSTEN, supra note 83, at 264 ("The Lochner decision was in many ways
an aberration with limited impact.").
99. Gregory S. Alexander, The Limits of Freedom of Contract in the Age of Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism,in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 103, 108 (F.H. Buckley ed.,
1999).
100. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
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contracts made it a condition of employment that workers not join a
labor union. Invoking Lochner, Harlan affirmed "the general
proposition that there is a liberty of contract which cannot be
unreasonably interfered with by legislation." 10 1
In many respects, however, the Justices began to move away
from Lochner. In Muller v, Oregon (1908), for instance, they upheld a
state law restricting the number of working hours for women in
factories and laundries in an opinion that reflected paternalist
assumptions about the place of women in society. 10 2 Peckham joined
the opinion. A year later the Court in McLean v. Arkansas (1909)
brushed aside a freedom of contract objection and upheld a statute
requiring that miners' wages be calculated by the weight of coal mined
before screening.103 Analogizing the measure to laws preventing fraud,
the Court noted that statutes mandating honest weights "have
frequently been sustained in the courts, although in compelling
certain modes of dealing they interfere with the freedom of
contract."1 04 This case, the last raising issues of contractual freedom
during Peckham's tenure, found him once again dissenting without
opinion.
It is evident that Peckham was more committed to the liberty
of contract doctrine than most of his colleagues even on the propertyconscious Fuller Court. Not only did Peckham stand out in his
dedication to contractual freedom, but the Supreme Court wielded the
doctrine sparingly both during his life and subsequently. Eventually,
of course, the Court rejected liberty of contract as a constitutional
norm.1 0 5 This repudiation has done much to cloud Peckham's historical
reputation.
Yet Peckham and Lochner cannot be banished so easily from
our constitutional history. Lochner, to be sure, is regularly cast as a
bogy by scholars from a wide range of ideological perspectives,
although for different reasons. But its enduring significance lies
elsewhere. Peckham's decision in Lochner remains at the heart of a
continuing dialogue about the role of the judiciary in American life. To
what extent are courts free to review legislative determinations? To
what extent are they bound to defer to the political branches of
government? In short, Lochner is at the center of the endless

101. Id. at 174.
102. 208 U.S. 412, 423 (1908).
103. 211 U.S. 539, 551 (1909).
104. Id. at 550.
105. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937) (stating that the
Constitution does not limit legislative power to restrict contractual freedom).
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discussion over judicial activism. No matter how much some scholars
may revile Lochner-and much of this criticism is exaggerated in my
view-they cannot escape dealing with its contested legacy. Indeed,
scholars have spilt an ocean of ink attempting to differentiate the
judicial activism in support of civil rights and civil liberties following
10 6
World War II from earlier judicial solicitude for economic rights.
One may well question whether there is a principled distinction, but
that is a topic for another day.
VI. TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
During the tenure of Chief Justice Fuller, the Supreme Court
came to grips in a sustained way with the takings issue for the first
time. In this area Peckham invariably voted with the majority and
authored several important opinions. It should be noted that in this
era the Court sometimes conflated taking of property with deprivation
of property without due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment. With the notable exception of the just compensation
norm, 10 7 the Fuller Court declined to extend the guarantees of the Bill
of Rights to the states. As a result, Peckham and his colleagues
analyzed some cases under the due process framework that today
would likely be treated as a takings issue.
Peckham wrote three opinions that bear on the contested
meaning of "public use" for the exercise of eminent domain power.
Because these decisions have figured prominently in the current
debate over the "public use" requirement, they deserve careful

attention. 108
At issue in United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Co.
(1896) was the authority of the federal government to acquire by
eminent domain parcels of land in order to preserve the Gettysburg
battlefield as a park.10 9 Opposing counsel primarily argued that the
106. See, e.g., FISS, supra note 3, at 9-12 (commenting on the differences between the
Warren and Fuller Courts and critiquing other scholarship on the topic); MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS,
THE LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND REALITY: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS FROM THE 1890S TO THE
1930S 185-91 (2001) (analyzing the "double standard" under which economic rights receive less
constitutional protection than "personal" rights); Bernstein, supra note 94, at 1514-25 (analyzing
the Lochner era).
107. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 255-58 (1897) (finding just
compensation applicable to states in an opinion joined by Peckham). For a discussion of this case,
see Collins, supra note 80, at 88-91.
108. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (Stevens, J.), 515-16 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (interpreting the Public Use Clause); see also Gideon Kanner, The Public Use Clause:
Constitutional Mandate or "Hortatory Fluff"?, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 335, 376-78 (2006) (discussing
Justice Peckham's influence on eminent domain jurisprudence).
109. 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
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powers of the national government did not encompass the
preservation of historic sites. Peckham, speaking for a unanimous
Court, had no difficulty in concluding that the proposed use of land
was of national importance and therefore within the powers of
Congress. Of course, the historic park would be open to the public and
would satisfy the most stringent definition of "public use."
Nonetheless, Peckham offered some brief comments about the exercise
of eminent domain. Pointing out that "the full value of the property
taken" must be paid by the public through taxation, he optimistically
asserted that there was little danger of governmental abuse of this
power. Peckham, however, adopted a more cautious approach when
eminent domain was delegated to a private enterprise. "In that case,"
he observed, "the presumption that the intended use for which the
corporation proposes to take the land is public, is not so strong as
where the government intends to use the land itself."110
A few months later, in Fallbrook IrrigationDistrict v. Bradley
(1896), Peckham had an opportunity to amplify his understanding of
the "public use" norm.1 1 1 In fact, Fallbrook was really not an eminent
domain case. 112 Rather, it involved a lawsuit by a landowner in
California contesting an assessment imposed on her land by an
irrigation district for the purpose of providing water for arid lands.
The federal circuit court enjoined the irrigation district's collector from
selling the plaintiffs land for nonpayment of the assessment. The
plaintiff premised her objection on the notion that irrigation was not a
public purpose, and hence the assessment constituted a deprivation of
property without due process of law under Loan Ass'n v. Topeka
(1874).113 Rejecting this contention, Peckham deferred to decisions of
the California courts that irrigation was a public use under the state
constitution and laws. It followed that the assessment did not
unconstitutionally deprive the plaintiff of property in violation of due
process.
Because the challenge in Fallbrookwas to governmental taxing
authority, Peckham correctly spoke largely in terms of "public
purpose." Indeed, he formulated the crucial inquiry as follows: "Is this
assessment, for the non-payment of which the land of the plaintiff was
to be sold, levied for a public purpose?"114 Nonetheless, Peckham did
110. Id. at 680.
111. 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
112. See Kanner, supra note 108, at 376 (declaring that Fallbrook"was not truly an eminent
domain case, and really had nothing to do with the Fifth Amendment's 'public use clause' ").
113. See Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 664 (1875) (insisting that "there can be no lawful
tax which is not laid for a public purpose").
114. Fallbrook, 164 U.S. at 158.
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discuss the issue of "public use" in his somewhat rambling opinion.
With no condemnation of property before the Court, however, his
remarks have the character of dicta. Peckham was prepared to allow
states some latitude concerning the exercise of eminent domain. "It is
obvious," he observed, "that what is a public use frequently and
largely depends upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the
particular subject-matter in regard to which the character of the use is
questioned." 115 Still, he insisted that "[t]he use for which private
property is to be taken must be a public one." 11 6 Importantly, Peckham
was persuaded that the irrigation of arid and "otherwise worthless"
land was a "public use," a term that he used interchangeably with
"public purpose." 117 In his mind it was not necessary that the entire
community should be able to enjoy an improvement in order to render
it a "public use." But Peckham emphasized that "[a]ll landowners in
the district have the right to a proportionate share of the water, and
no one landowner is favored above his fellow in his right to use the
water."11 8 He concluded that providing water to arid land was a
"public purpose," the cost of which could be legitimately paid by
general taxes or assessments. 119 All in all, Fallbrook, which focused
primarily on taxation issues, is a curious case to be treated as a
seminal authority in defining "public use" in the context of eminent
domain.
Peckham demonstrated that he did not give a carte blanche
endorsement to the taking of private property when he joined the
Court's opinion in Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Nebraska (1896).120
At issue was a Nebraska statute that authorized a state agency to
compel a railroad to grant part of its land to private individuals for the
purpose of erecting a grain elevator. The law was a response to
agitation by farm organizations seeking to control the price of grain
storage by establishing competing facilities. The Court described the
proceedings as "in essence -and effect, a taking of private property of
the railroad corporation, for the private use of the petitioners."' 12 1 It
invalidated the statute on grounds that the taking of the private
property of one person by the state for the private use of another
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 159-60.
Id. at 161.
Id.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 164.
164 U.S. 403 (1896).
Id. at 417.
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ruling seemed to bar the exercise of eminent domain for the benefit of
private parties.
Justice Peckham's third opinion dealing with the "public use"
122
issue, Clark v. Nash (1905), also involved the irrigation of arid land.
A Utah statute empowered individuals to condemn land for the
purpose of obtaining water for mining or irrigation. The plaintiff, who
was entitled to use water from a nearby creek, sought to widen by one
foot an already existing ditch on the defendant's contiguous land. The
evidence indicated that water would reach the plaintiffs property
through such an enlarged ditch. The Supreme Court of Utah defined
"public use" broadly as a taking that promoted public interest and
affirmed a condemnation order conditioned upon payment of $40 in
compensation to the defendant. The defendant argued before the U.S.
Supreme Court that this action amounted to a taking for private not
public use, so the order consequently deprived the defendant of
property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Peckham began his opinion by asserting that in many states
the defendant's contention would be sound but stressed that a
determination of "public use" might be contingent upon unique local
circumstances. Whether obtaining water was for a "public use," he
observed, "may depend upon a number of considerations relating to
the situation of the State and its possibilities for land cultivation, or
the successful prosecution of its mining or other industries."'123 When
the exercise of eminent domain was based "upon some peculiar
condition of the soil or climate, or other peculiarity of the State,"
Peckham added, the Supreme Court was inclined to defer to the
judgment of state lawmakers. 124 Having stressed the fact-dependent
nature of the determination of "public use," Peckham then
misleadingly stated that the earlier Fallbrook case turned upon the
condemnation of land by a corporation to obtain a water supply. As we
have seen, that case in fact involved the validity of a special tax
assessment. Not surprisingly, Peckham found that allowing the
plaintiff to enlarge the ditch to irrigate land "which otherwise would
remain absolutely valueless" satisfied the "public use" norm.1 25 Under
these particular circumstances, he was evidently persuaded that the
modest incursion on private property by the irrigation scheme could be
justified by its overall benefit for the public as a resource.
122.
123.
124.
125.

198 U.S. 361 (1905).
Id. at 367.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 369.
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It bears emphasis, however, that Peckham expressly confined
the reach of Clark to its facts. In language often unaccountably
omitted from subsequent treatment of the case, he declared: "But we
do not desire to be understood by this decision as approving of the
broad proposition that private property may be taken in all cases
where the taking may promote the public interest and tend to develop
the natural resources of the State."126 While Peckham might be faulted
for employing some imprecise language in his three eminent domain
opinions, he never held that legislative determinations of "public use"
were virtually conclusive or that private property could be taken for
any supposed public purpose. Moreover, the factual context of
Fallbrook and Clark is important. It is not difficult to distinguish
taking a narrow strip of arid land, which involved no displacement of
residences or business enterprises, from more recent economic
127
development projects.

VII. RATE REGULATION
One of the most protracted and vexing issues before the
Supreme Court during Peckham's tenure was the extent to which
state or federal governments could control the rates charged by
railroads. As the principal arteries of commerce and travel among the
states, railroads occupied a vital place in American life at the turn of
the twentieth century. Shippers and farmers saw the carriers as
wielding monopoly power and charging excessive rates. Railroads, on
the other hand, asserted that rates imposed by state legislatures or
governmental agencies were often unreasonably low. They argued that
such regulations indirectly deprived the carriers of the value of their
128
property, and amounted to a de facto confiscation.
In a line of decisions rendered before Peckham took his place
on the bench, the Fuller Court had circumscribed state regulatory
authority. It established federal judicial supervision of state-imposed
rates under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and insisted that railroads were constitutionally entitled to charge
reasonable rates for the use of their property. 129 Peckham was no
doubt in full agreement with these developments. Shortly after he
became a member of the Court, Peckham joined his colleagues in
126. Id.
127. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio correctly noted the limited nature of the
holding in Clark as dependent upon unique local conditions. City of Norwood v. Horney, 853
N.E.2d 1115, 1133 (Ohio 2006).
128. JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 80-96 (2001).
129. ELY, supra note 6, at 83-87.

2009]

RUFUS W. PECKHAM

holding that legislative control of tolls on a private turnpike was
subject to the same constitutional limitations. 130 More importantly, he
signed on to the Court's opinion in Smyth v. Ames (1898), in which the
Justices sought to distinguish a valid rate regulation from
131
confiscation.
In Smyth, the Court ruled that a steep reduction in intrastate
freight rates mandated by the Nebraska legislature constituted a
deprivation of property without due process of law. In so doing, the
Court articulated a standard for judicial review of rates, ruling that a
railroad was entitled to a "fair return" upon the "fair value" of its
property. Under the "fair value" rule, courts looked primarily at the
current or replacement value of a company's assets as the baseline for
calculating the reasonableness of imposed rates. As a consequence of
Smyth, the federal courts became deeply involved in rate cases and
state ratemaking authority was sharply restricted. Railroad
companies increasingly sought federal court injunctions to restrain
enforcement of state-fixed rates.
Some states were so upset at federal judicial review of
intrastate rates that they attempted to deter railroads from pursuing
relief in the federal courts. This set the stage for Peckham's most
significant contribution to the controversy over rate regulation. At
issue in the seminal case of Ex Parte Young (1908) was a Minnesota
132 It
statute that required reductions in passenger and freight charges.
also specified huge fines and severe criminal penalties on railroads
and their agents for violation of the law. The obvious purpose behind
these penalties was to intimidate carriers and their officers from
testing the validity of the rate reductions in court. Maintaining that
the mandated rates were confiscatory and unconstitutional, railroad
stockholders secured a temporary injunction from the federal circuit
court prohibiting Edward T. Young, the Minnesota Attorney General,
from enforcing the measure. Young violated the injunction by
attempting to force obedience to the new rate schedule in state court.
Found guilty of contempt by the federal circuit court, Young was fined,
directed to dismiss the state court proceeding, and jailed until he
complied. Young then sought a writ of habeas corpus from the

130. Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 598 (1896).
131. 169 U.S. 466, 546-47 (1898).
132. 209 U.S. 123, 127 (1908). For extensive examination of Young and Peckham's opinion,
see RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE IRON HORSE AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE RAILROADS AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 181-208 (1993); William F. Duker, Mr.
Justice Rufus W. Peckham and the Case of Ex Parte Young: Lochnerizing Munn v. Illinois, 1980
BYU L. REV. 539, 539-58.
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Supreme Court, arguing that the federal lawsuit was in reality
against the state in violation of the Eleventh Amendment.
Speaking for the Court, Peckham ruled that the penalty
provisions were unconstitutional on their face because they effectively
denied access to the federal courts to determine the adequacy of
imposed rates. He tellingly observed:
[W]hen the penalties for disobedience are by fines so enormous and imprisonment so
severe as to intimidate the company and its officers from resorting to the courts to test
the validity of the legislation, the result is the same as if the law in terms prohibited the
13 3
company from seeking judicial construction of laws which deeply affect its rights.

Rejecting the Eleventh Amendment defense, Peckham insisted that
when a state official took steps to enforce an unconstitutional law "he
is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is
subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual
conduct." 134 Peckham's distinction between suits against states and
suits against state officials alleged to be acting unconstitutionally
relied on a legal fiction that permitted circumvention of the Eleventh
Amendment. Young has endured as a foundational decision for
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence because the power to enjoin state
officials from violating national laws proved essential for maintaining
35
the federal scheme of government.1
Our concern, however, is less with the intricacies of Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence than with what the Young opinion reveals
about Peckham's thinking. Peckham was surely influenced by his
suspicion of state railroad regulations and his desire to protect the
property rights of the carriers from confiscatory rates. To this end, he
emphasized that railroads should not be required to risk severe
penalties in order to obtain federal judicial review of state-imposed
rates.
Thus, Young provides a jurisdictional counterpart for Smyth. It
was vital to preserve access to a federal forum in order to guarantee
that regulated industries received a "fair return" on their investments.
Aside from his dedication to the rights of property owners, Peckham
was influenced by utilitarian considerations. Protection of investment
capital was an important feature of the work of the Fuller era, an
attitude that Peckham shared. Security of private property was linked
with a continued flow of investment capital and with economic growth.
"Over eleven million dollars, it is estimated, are invested in railroad

133. Young, 209 U.S. at 147.
134. Id. at 160.
135. JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED
AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 121-35 (1987).
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property, owned by many thousands of people who are scattered over
the whole country from ocean to ocean," Peckham pointedly
commented in Young, "and they are entitled to equal protection from
the laws and from the courts, with the owners of all other kinds of
136
property, no more, no less."
Peckham's skepticism about rate regulation was also manifest
in a series of cases that narrowly construed the authority of the newly
created Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC"). 137 He repeatedly
joined his colleagues in limiting the agency's power to control railroad
charges. The Interstate Commerce Act did not expressly empower the
ICC to fix rates, but the Commission assumed that its express
authority to review the reasonableness of rates included by
implication such power. The Supreme Court halted this practice in
ICC v. Cincinnati,New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Co. (1897),
reasoning that a ratemaking power could not be implied. 138 The ICC
was thus compelled to stop its efforts to set rates for railroads. Even
more telling was the Court's interpretation of the long-haul, shorthaul clause of the Interstate Commerce Act. This clause was aimed at
the perceived price discrimination that occurred when railroads
charged more for short-haul freight shipments than for long haul. By
ruling in ICC v. Alabama Midland Railway Co. (1897) that the
existence of competing rail facilities must be considered in applying
this clause, the Court effectively negated the long-haul, short-haul
provision of the Act.139
Peckham's voting pattern in the rate regulation cases
demonstrates his preference for private economic ordering and
reluctance to allow broad governmental control over charges. Still,
Peckham and his colleagues stopped well short of blocking all
governmental supervision of railroad charges or mandating a
supposed laissez-faire regime on the industry. They sought a middle
ground, seeking to bar the imposition of unremunerative rates. Rates
regulation was particularly suspect because it altered the working of
the market economy and implicitly served to redistribute property. It
also threatened the security of investments and thus potentially

136. 209 U.S. at 165. As further evidence of his utilitarian thinking, Peckham added: "It
cannot be to the real interest of anyone to injure or cripple the resources of the railroad
companies of the country, because the prosperity of both the railroads and the country is most
intimately connected." Id. at 166.
137. ELY, supra note 128, at 93-96.
138. 167 U.S. 479, 494 (1897).
139. 168 U.S. 144, 175-76 (1897); see also Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner
Era:Lessons from the Controversy over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187,
208-15 (1984).
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hampered economic growth. Peckham and his fellow Justices hoped to
rein in, not totally eliminate, legislative authority over rates.
VIII. REGULATION OF HEALTH, SAFETY, AND MORALS
Notwithstanding his dedication to economic liberty and his
dislike of rate controls, Peckham upheld numerous regulations that
fell within the ambit of traditional state police power to protect the
health, safety, and morals of the public. He repeatedly sustained
health and safety measures against challenges that such laws
amounted to a deprivation of property without due process. For
example, Peckham, writing for the Court, validated a Chicago
ordinance requiring a license to sell cigarettes. 140 He stressed that
states were free to determine what kinds of businesses ought to be
licensed to preserve community health and safety. Moreover, Peckham
ruled that, pursuant to the police power, states could seize and destroy
unwholesome food without providing the owner a prior hearing.
Emphasizing "the right and duty of the State to protect and guard...
the lives and health of its inhabitants," he declared that food unfit for
human consumption was "a nuisance of the most dangerous kind." 141
In an age before comprehensive zoning, Peckham was prepared
to sustain legislation requiring owners to incur expenses in order to
comply with health and safety regulations. In 1906 he joined the
Court in upholding a New York law directing tenement owners to
install modern sanitary facilities. 142 Peckham's vote here was not
surprising given his opinion as a New York judge in Rector of Trinity
Church upholding earlier tenement reform legislation.
Peckham was also sympathetic to fledgling land use controls.
In Welch v. Swasey (1909), writing for the Court, he affirmed the
validity of statutes limiting the height of buildings. 43 Stressing the
importance of local circumstances, Peckham ruled that it was
reasonable to distinguish between the height of buildings in
residential and commercial districts. He justified this classification by
explaining that taller buildings in commercial areas posed less danger
in the event of fire. In this context, Peckham was inclined to defer to

140. Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183, 189 (1900).
141. N. Am. Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 315 (1908).
142. Moeschen v. Tenement House Dep't of N.Y., 203 U.S. 583, 583 (1906), aff'g Tenement
House Dep't of N.Y. v. Moeschen, 72 N.E. 231 (N.Y. 1904). For the background of this case, see
Judith A. Gilbert, Tenements and Takings: Tenement House Department of New York v.
Moeschen as a Counterpoint to Lochner v. New York, 18 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 437, 437-505
(1991).
143. 214 f.S. 91, 107-08 (1909).
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the judgment of the state courts that the statutes promoted public
safety. By implicitly recognizing that the enjoyment of land by private
owners could negatively impact third-party owners, he paved the way
for more intensive land use controls.
Railroading was an especially hazardous enterprise, posing
dangers to adjacent landowners and employees. As a result, both the
federal and state governments in the nineteenth century imposed
safety standards on the carriers. Peckham regularly voted to affirm
the validity of such measures. He agreed, for example, that states
could make railroads absolutely liable for damages from fires caused
by railroad operations. 144 Likewise, Peckham voted to construe broadly
and enforce vigorously the Safety Appliance Act, which required
railroads in interstate commerce to use air brakes and automatic
couplers. 145 The Act also banned the assumption of risk defense for
injuries arising from violations of the statute.
Yet there were limits to how far Peckham was prepared to
modify common law tort rules in the context of railroad accidents. He
joined the dissenters when the Court held that the statutory abolition
of assumption of risk by the Safety Appliance Act also operated to
relieve employees from liability for contributory negligence. 146 The
dissenters argued that contributory negligence was a distinct defense
from assumption of risk, and that the Act did not set aside the
ordinary rules of contributory negligence. Moreover, in cases arising
under diversity jurisdiction, Peckham consistently voted to invoke the
fellow servant doctrine to deny recovery to injured or killed railroad
employees.147
Nor was he receptive to congressional attempts to abolish the
fellow servant rule with respect to common carriers. In the Employers'
Liability Cases (1908), the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal
Employers' Liability Act was unconstitutional because it covered
railroad employees engaged in intrastate as well as interstate
commerce. 148 The Court pointed out, however, that Congress could
regulate employment relationships within interstate commerce. In a
concurring opinion, Peckham, joined by two other Justices, agreed
that the Act was unconstitutional because it reached injuries
144. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1897).
145. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 295 (1908); Johnson v. S.
Pac. Co., 196 U.S. 1, 17 (1904).
146. Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburg Ry. Co., 205 U.S. 1, 14-20 (1907) (Brewer,
J., dissenting).
147. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Dixon, 194 U.S. 338, 346 (1904); New England R.R. v. Conroy, 175
U.S. 323, 329 (1899).
148. 207 U.S. 463 (1908).
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occurring in intrastate traffic. But he pointedly refused to accept "all
that is stated as to the power of Congress to legislate upon the subject
of the relations between master and servant."149 Evidently Peckham
questioned the power of Congress to regulate issues relating to
employment at all. It is fair to conclude that Peckham was slow to
realize that, in an age of dangerous equipment and a complex
workplace, the fellow servant rule was an unsuitable doctrine to
address work-related injuries. Instead, he clung to the notion that
individuals were free agents who had to accept responsibility for their
own carelessness. Fault was the only legitimate basis on which to
impose liability for accidents.
Public health regulations also raised difficult issues. By the
late nineteenth century public health authorities sought to check
smallpox epidemics by compulsory vaccination. 150 Efforts to protect
the community with such programs pitted exercise of the police power
against claims of individual liberty. This conflict occurred in a climate
in which much of the public remained fearful of vaccination and
disliked governmental intrusion in what were seen as private health
decisions. In 1902, confronted with a smallpox epidemic in
Massachusetts, the Cambridge Board of Health, pursuant to state law,
required all residents not recently* vaccinated to submit to the
procedure. Reverend Henning Jacobson, an outspoken opponent of
vaccination, refused to be vaccinated and was fined $5. Massachusetts
courts dismissed Jacobson's challenge to the constitutionality of the
15 1
compulsory vaccination law, and he petitioned the Supreme Court.
In Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905), the Supreme Court, by a
vote of 7-2, broadly upheld state authority to enact "health laws of
every description" to safeguard the public.15 2 The Court reasoned that
the common good must prevail over claims of individual liberty. It
conceded, however, that there could be situations where public health
measures were "sufficiently arbitrary and oppressive . . . as to justify
the interference of the courts." Peckham, joined by Justice Brewer,
dissented without opinion. He apparently felt that requiring a healthy
adult to undergo vaccination violated the liberty of individuals and
exposed them to unjustified risks. This attitude was consistent with
his earlier vote on the New York Court of Appeals to limit the power to
impose smallpox quarantines. Peckham's dissent exemplified his
attachment to individualism, a principle that in Jacobson found

149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 504.
COLGROVE, supra note 56, at 33-38.
Id. at 38-44.
197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).
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expression in an area other than economic rights. Moreover,
Peckham's libertarian position was not entirely out of step with public
opinion. Compulsory vaccination of adults became increasingly rare,
and public health programs focused instead on vaccination as a school
entry requirement. 153
IX. ANTITRUST
Clearly a central theme of Peckham's jurisprudence was
defense of individual liberty, and especially economic freedom, from
statist interference. Yet Peckham was also alert to safeguard the
entrepreneurial freedom of small business from private incursions.
This was made evident in a line of decisions by Peckham construing
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to protect competition. Growing antimonopoly sentiment became a central part of American political life in
the late nineteenth century. Fear of business combinations and
predatory behavior motivated the passage of the Sherman Act and
litigation challenging business conduct. 154 Yet the purpose of the
155
antitrust laws has long been the subject of debate.
In United States v. E. C. Knight Co. (1895), a case decided
before Peckham joined the bench, the Supreme Court ruled that
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause was confined to
traffic between states and did not extend to manufacturing, which was
seen as local in nature.1 56 This ruling obviously circumscribed the
reach of the Sherman Act. Peckham had no quarrel with this
distinction between manufacturing and interstate trade.
Where the power of Congress was free from doubt, however,
Peckham favored vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws. In
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n (1897) Peckham,
writing for a majority of five, invalidated a price-fixing arrangement
among western railroads. 157 He first determined that the Sherman Act
applied to common carriers engaged in transportation among the
states. Peckham brushed aside the argument that the Act did not
cover railroads because they were already governed by the Interstate
Commerce Act. Next, he insisted that the statutory language banning
"every contract, combination. . . in restraint of trade or commerce"
encompassed all contracts that restrained freedom of trade. Peckham
153. COLGROVE, supra note 56, at 65-74.
154. HALL & KARSTEN, supra note 83, at 225-26.
155. James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in
Constitutionaland Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 283-300 (1989).
156. 156 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1895).
157. 166 U.S. 290, 343 (1897).
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rejected the contention that the Sherman Act only made illegal those
restraints of trade unreasonable at common law. He was not
persuaded that Congress intended to exempt the rail industry from
the Sherman Act, and he stressed that the impact of competition on
railroad rates was a policy matter for Congress. "Competition, free and
unrestricted," he revealingly noted, "is the general rule which governs
all the ordinary business pursuits and transactions of life." 158
In reaching this result, Peckham spoke in broad terms about
the nature of antitrust concerns. He warned that business
combinations might drive out "small dealers and worthy men,"159 to
the ultimate detriment of the public. Peckham recognized that
changes in the economy could produce painful adjustments for labor
and business. But in his mind, different considerations pertained with
respect to combinations and trusts. Peckham voiced apprehension that
combinations of capital might reduce prices, which "would be dearly
paid for by the ruin of such a [small business] class, and the
absorption of control over one commodity by an all-powerful
combination of capital." 160 Enlarging upon this, he significantly
declared:
In this light it is not material that the price of an article may be lowered. It is in the
power of the combination to raise it, and the result in any event is unfortunate for the
country by depriving it of the services of a large number of small but independent
dealers who were familiar with the business and who had spent their lives in it, and
who supported themselves and their families from the small profits realized therein.
Whether they be able to find other avenues to earn their livelihood is not so material,
because it is not for the real prosperity of any country that such changes should occur
which result in transferring an independent business man, the head of his
establishment, small though it might be, into a mere servant or agent of a corporation
for selling the commodities which he once manufactured or dealt in, having no voice in
shaping the business policy of the company and bound to obey orders issued by
others.161

To Peckham, the antitrust laws were a means to protect competition
rather than enhance economic efficiency.
In Trans-Missouri Freight, Peckham formulated a categorical
standard that the Sherman Act banned all combinations directly
restraining interstate commerce. 162 He rejected any notion of a
balancing test that weighed the actual impact of restraints. In
contrast, Justice Edward D. White took the position that the Act only

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 337.
at 323.
at 324.
at 309-10.

2009]

RUFUS W. PECKHAM

625

outlawed unreasonable restraints of trade, 163 a position that allowed
courts to determine the reasonableness of private economic conduct.
This difference between Peckham and White over the interpretation of
the Sherman Act framed the larger debate over antitrust policy for the
next decade. Although Peckham's formulation prevailed at first, the
Court ultimately adopted White's views after Peckham's death. 164
In 1898, Peckham, again speaking for the Court in United
States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, struck down a similar agreement to fix
rates among railroads providing transportation between Chicago and
the Atlantic coast.1 65 He was unimpressed with the novel argument
that the Sherman Act, as construed by the Court, interfered with the
liberty of contract. As we have seen, Peckham was usually a champion
of contractual freedom. But here he explained that individuals only
had a right to make lawful contracts, and that Congress or state
legislatures could prohibit certain types of contractual arrangements.
"There are many kinds of contracts," Peckham asserted, "which, while
not in themselves immoral or mala in se, may yet be prohibited by the
legislation of the States."1 66 There was no liberty of contract to
eliminate competition between the parties. Peckham finally
maintained that the "alleged baneful effects of competition" on
1 67
railroads was a question for Congress to decide.
In Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States (1899),
Peckham further demonstrated his propensity to enforce the Sherman
Act when the transaction involved was within the scope of
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.1 6 At issue was
an agreement among cast-iron pipe manufacturers to fix prices and
divide markets. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Peckham ruled that
agreements to control prices that directly restrained competition in
interstate commerce violated the Act. In response to a liberty of
contract argument advanced by the defendants, Peckham tellingly
observed:
The power of Congress over this subject seems to us much more important and
necessary than the liberty of the citizen to enter into contracts of the nature above
mentioned, free from the control of Congress, because the direct results of such contracts

163. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 79, at 294 (observing that Justice White argued that "[t]he
Sherman Act would violate constitutional liberty of contract if it deviated from the common law
rule of reason and condemned certain restraints as illegal per se").
164. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 80-82 (1911) (finding the
Sherman Act covered only "unreasonable" restraints of trade).
165. 171 U.S. 505, 568-69 (1898).
166. Id. at 571-73.
167. Id. at 576.
168. 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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might be the regulation of commerce among the States, possibly quite as effectually as if
169
a State had passed a statute of like tenor as the contract.

Peckham emphatically maintained that the right of individuals to
enter contracts was limited by the power of Congress to regulate
commerce among the states. As Herbert Hovenkamp observed,
Peckham's opinion in Addyston Pipe "completely disassociated the
classical concern with liberty of contract from the Sherman Act's
concern about elimination of competition." 170
Yet Peckham acknowledged that there were limits to the reach
of the Sherman Act. He adhered to the view that not every business
enterprise was so linked to commerce among the states as to fall
within the regulatory power of Congress. In Hopkins v. United States
(1898), Peckham determined that an association of merchants buying
and selling livestock on commission at the Kansas City stockyards was
local in nature and therefore not within the purview of interstate
commerce. 171 The rules of the association fixed sales commissions and
barred members from doing business with non-members. Such
provisions unquestionably constituted a restraint. Peckham insisted,
however, that charges for local services did not have a direct impact
upon interstate trade and that association members were not engaged
in interstate commerce. He affirmed "the distinction between a
regulation which directly affects and embarrasses interstate trade or
commerce and one which is nothing more than a charge for a local
facility provided for the transaction of such commerce. ' 172
Peckham adhered to his position that there were limits on
congressional power over commerce in the famous case of Northern
Securities Co. v. United States (1904).173 A splintered majority of five
Justices voted to invalidate the formation of a holding company that
controlled the stock of competing railroads in the Pacific Northwest
under the Sherman Act. A plurality of four Justices held that all
mergers that directly restrained interstate trade were illegal per se. 174
Justice Brewer concurred on different grounds, insisting that the
169. Id. at 230.
170. HOVENKAMP, supra note 79, at 295. Other scholars share this view. See, e.g., MARTIN J.
SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 132-33 (1988) (finding that

Peckham saw congressional commerce power as curtailing liberty of contract). It should be noted
that there is a different interpretation of Peckham's thinking about the relationship between
contractual freedom and the Sherman Act. See Meese, supra note 26, at 53-67 (concluding that
Peckham did not subordinate liberty of contract generally to the commerce power, but only ruled
that "direct restraints" on commerce were unprotected by freedom of contract).
171. 171 U.S. 578, 589-90 (1898).
172. Id. at 597.
173. 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
174. Id. at 331-32.
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Sherman Act only banned unreasonable restraints of trade. 175
Peckham dissented, joining the opinions of Justices White and Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. Both of these dissents, and especially the opinion
by Justice White, stressed that the power of Congress was confined to
traffic between the states. 176 White reasoned that congressional
regulatory authority did not extend to the ownership of railroad stock,
which he did not deem to be commerce at all. He characterized the
ownership of stock as a form of constitutionally protected property
rather than commerce, and thus stock ownership was beyond the
reach of Congress.
The Northern Securities case also marked what seemed to be a
shift by Peckham away from a literal reading of the Sherman Act and
toward the rule of reason espoused by Justices Brewer and White.
Peckham's thinking can perhaps best be explained in terms of the
novel legal issues presented. Trans-Missouri FreightAss'n and Joint
Traffic Ass'n involved price-fixing agreements that undercut
competition as the arbiter of fair prices. The railroad merger in
Northern Securities, on the other hand, implicated the right of
property owners to sell a business. Peckham doubtless shared White's
view that "the principle that the ownership of property is embraced
within the power of Congress to regulate commerce, whenever that
body deems that a particular character of ownership ... may restrain
commerce... , is in my opinion, in conflict with the most elementary
conceptions of rights of property."'177 In short, to the dissenters,
considerations of federalism dovetailed with protection of property
rights. Under these circumstances, Peckham may well have reasoned
that a per se illegality rule was appropriate to protect competition
against price-fixing, but that mergers should be evaluated under the
178
more flexible rule of reason.
How should we assess Peckham's record with respect to
antitrust enforcement? Two points warrant emphasis. First, Peckham
was motivated to protect small independent entrepreneurs against
illicit corporate combinations. As James May cogently noted, "Justice
Peckham's antitrust opinions reflected his complementary antipathy
179
to nongovernmental threats to individual liberty and property."
175. Id. at 360-63 (Brewer, J., concurring) (finding that the Northern Securities Company
unreasonably restrained interstate commerce).
176. Id. at 364-400.
177. Id. at 370 (White, J., dissenting).
178. See Rudolph J. Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263, 277
(discussing the tension between competition and property rights in Peckham's antitrust
thinking).
179. May, supra note 155, at 304.
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This calls into question the common stereotype of Peckham as a onesided defender of business interests. In fact, he was instrumental in
vitalizing, within limits, governmental power to combat monopoly.
Without losing sight of federalism concerns as expressed in Hopkins,
Peckham did much to strengthen early antitrust doctrine.' 8 0 Second,
despite his commitment to contractual freedom, Peckham never took
the position that liberty of contract was an absolute right. Some
legislative restraints on individual contractual rights could be
justified. Foremost among these were congressional efforts to preserve
competition and protect small business.
X. FEDERAL POLICE POWER
In accordance with his attachment to a limited national
government, Peckham was hostile to the gradual movement toward a
federal police power. It was a generally accepted constitutional norm
in the nineteenth century that the federal government did not possess
authority to regulate public health, safety, and morals. Police power
was seen as a function of the states. At the start of the twentieth
century, however, Congress began to make novel use of the Commerce
Clause and taxing power to control indirectly matters not within its
enumerated powers.' 8 ' For instance, Congress sought to ban the
transportation of lottery tickets from state to state. Although the
obvious purpose of the statute was to suppress lotteries, not to protect
interstate trade, a sharply divided Court upheld the measure in
Champion v. Ames (1903).182
Peckham disagreed. He joined Chief Justice Fuller's dissenting
opinion, which argued that Congress was in effect exercising a police
power to guard public morals. 8 3 Doubtless Peckham shared Fuller's
view that the majority opinion in Champion was inconsistent with the
intention of the Framers and threatened to overturn the constitutional
balance between the federal and state governments.
In the same vein, Peckham expressed unhappiness when
Congress resorted to taxation to prohibit activities that it could not
reach directly. He dissented without opinion in McCray v. United

180. Peckham joined two other opinions applying the Sherman Act to local enterprises that
were an integral part of the flow of commerce among the states. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274,
297 (1908) (applying the Sherman Act to a nationwide boycott by a union against dealers in hats
to support unionization efforts at factory manufacturing hats); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196
U.S. 375, 396 (1905) (applying the Sherman Act to buying and selling cattle in stockyards).
181. ELY, supra note 6, at 138-39.
182. 188 U.S. 321, 354 (1903).
183. Id. at 364-75.
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States (1904), in which the Court upheld a prohibitory tax on
oleomargarine.1 8 4 This ruling seemingly opened the door for Congress
to use the taxing power to regulate indirectly all aspects of the
economy. Such a broad reading of the taxing power was clearly at odds
with Peckham's commitment to a limited national government.
XI. DORMANT COMMERCE POWER

By the time Peckham arrived on the Supreme Court, it had
long taken the position that the Commerce Clause impliedly restricted
the power of the states to interfere with interstate commerce.18 5 Under
Fuller, the Court forcefully wielded this dormant commerce doctrine to
bar state-imposed obstacles to trade across state lines.1 8 6 Peckham
regularly joined his colleagues in protecting the national market for
goods. He voted, for example, to strike down state laws directed
against the interstate shipment of alcoholic beverages and
cigarettes.1 8 7 Peckham also authored two opinions affirming the right
to sell margarine as an article of commerce. Invalidating a state ban
on the importation of margarine in Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania
(1898), Peckham proclaimed: "The general rule to be deduced from the
decisions of this court is that a lawful article of commerce cannot be
wholly excluded from importation into a State from another State
where it was manufactured or grown."18 8 In a parallel case, he ruled
that a New Hampshire requirement that margarine sold in the state
be colored pink effectively hampered sales and amounted to a
18 9
prohibition in violation of the Commerce Clause.
Similarly, Peckham wrote opinions that curbed state regulation
of railroads as an interference with interstate commerce. He looked
skeptically at state laws that required interstate trains to stop at local
stations if there was already adequate local service.1 90 In the same

184. 195 U.S. 27, 63-64 (1904).
185. See sources cited supra note 81.
186. ELY, supra note 6, at 140-48.
187. Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U.S. 343, 364-88 (1900) (Peckham, J., joining Brewer, J.,
dissenting) (declaring that states could not bar importation and sale of cigarettes); Rhodes v.
Iowa, 170 U.S. 412, 425-26 (1898); Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 99-100 (1897).
188. 171 U.S. 1, 12 (1898).
189. Collins v. New Hampshire, 171 U.S. 30, 34 (1898).
190. Miss. R.R. Comm'n v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 203 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1906). As in his antitrust
opinions, Peckham stressed the importance of competition in the rail industry. He observed:
The transportation of passengers on interstate trains as rapidly as can with
safety be done is the inexorable demand of the public who use such trains.
Competition between great trunk lines is fierce and at times bitter. Each line
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vein, Peckham ruled that the enforcement of Kentucky's long-haul,
short-haul provision amounted to an unconstitutional regulation of
interstate commerce when applied to shipments from outside the
state.191
XII. INSULAR CASES
The insular cases were a cluster of decisions that addressed the
constitutional status of the overseas territories acquired by the United
States following the Spanish-American War.192 Although nearly
forgotten today, the insular cases were at the center of an intense
controversy over the emergence of American imperialism. A pivotal
issue was whether the Constitution and Bill of Rights applied to the
inhabitants of the new territories. In Downes v. Bidwell (1901), the
most important of the insular cases, a fragmented Court majority
determined that the Constitution did not extend to the newly acquired
possessions without congressional action. 193 In effect, the decision
permitted Congress to exercise virtually plenary authority over the
territories.
Peckham would have none of this.1 94 He wrote only one brief
concurring opinion in an insular case, but he rather consistently
adhered to the position that the Constitution applied by its own force
to the new possessions. In the language of the day, he felt that the
Constitution followed the flag. Contemporaries classed Peckham as
one of the "anti-imperialist" Justices. 95 Since Peckham never
explained his thinking about the overseas territories, any analysis
requires a degree of conjecture. Several points warrant mention. First,
Peckham's voting pattern in the insular cases was consistent with his
commitment to a limited national government and a strict
construction of federal power. Second, his behavior closely tracked the
must do its best even to obtain its fair share of the transportation between
states, both of passengers and freight.
Id. at 346; see also Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Wharton, 207 U.S. 328, 331 (1907) (Peckham, J.)
("[Alny command of a state, whether made directly or through the instrumentality of a railroad
commission, which orders, or the necessary effect of which is to order, the stopping of an
interstate train at a named station or stations, if it directly regulated interstate commerce, is
void.").
191. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Eubank, 184 U.S. 27, 35-36 (1902).
192. See generally FISS, supra note 3, at 225-56 (discussing how the Court responded to the
issues concerning governance of overseas territories through the series of decisions referred to as
the Insular Cases); BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF
AMERICAN EMPIRE 15-255 (2006).
193. 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901).

194. Id. at 347-75 (Peckham, J., joining Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
195. See SPARROW, supra note 192, at 109-10.
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anti-imperialist views expressed by national leaders of the Democratic
Party, including Grover Cleveland. As we have seen, Peckham was not
partisan in his approach to judicial questions, but he was a loyal
Cleveland Democrat. Finally, it should be noted that many of the
insular cases, including Downes, concerned the validity of tariffs on
goods shipped to and from overseas territories. Democrats in the
Gilded Age were generally opposed to protective tariffs, and this
196
sentiment may have influenced Peckham.
Given his general outlook on the relationship between the new
territories and the United States, Peckham's concurring opinion in
United States v. Dorr (1904) has puzzled historians. 197 In Dorr, the
Court held that, absent congressional action, the Constitution did not
confer the right of trial by jury in criminal cases in the Philippine
Islands. 198 Peckham, speaking for two other Justices, concurred in the
result in a short opinion that casts little light on his thinking. 199 He
expressly rejected Downes as controlling authority, once more
declining to adopt the incorporation theory. Yet Peckham failed to
make clear his own position, which was seemingly at odds with his
previous voting pattern in insular cases.
Again, some speculation may be in order. Dorr involved
criminal procedure not commerce or property. Peckham may have
been persuaded by the majority's contention that trial by jury was
simply not feasible as a practical matter for the inhabitants of the
Philippines at that time. The majority opinion, moreover, emphasized
that congressional authority in the territories was confined by
inherent principles of free government. Such limiting language may
have persuaded Peckham to focus on the narrow question of jury trials
rather than the larger issue of the scope of congressional power.
XIII. CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
Consistent with the prevailing racial and political attitudes at
the turn of the twentieth century, the Fuller Court demonstrated little
concern for the civil rights of racial minorities. 200 In a line of cases
196. See MORTON KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY

AMERICA 378-80 (1977) (pointing out that President Cleveland and the Democratic Party
stressed tariff reductions and free trade).
197. United States v. Dorr, 195 U.S. 138, 178--83 (1904) (Peckham, J., concurring).
198. Id. at 149.
199. Id. at 153-54.
200. JOHN BRAEMAN,

BEFORE THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION:

THE

OLD COURT AND

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 121 (1988) (observing that the "Fuller Court's acquiescence in the relegation
of the Negro to second-class citizenship represented accommodation to the facts of life in turn-ofthe-century America"); ELY, supra note 6, at 155-60.
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starting with Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), the Court affirmed state laws
imposing racial segregation in the South. 201 In sharp contrast to his
keen regard for economic liberty, Peckham was unimpressed with
claims of equality and consistently deferred to state authority over
race relations. He repeatedly joined decisions that upheld racial
segregation in public and private facilities 202 and allowed southern
states to restrict black political participation. 203 Even more revealing
was Peckham's dissent when the Fuller Court confronted lynching and
mob violence. In United States v. Shipp (1909), the Court majority of
five found a sheriff, a deputy, and members of a mob guilty of
contempt for lynching a black man convicted of rape while his appeal
to the Supreme Court was pending. 20 4 Speaking for the four
dissenters, Peckham denounced the criminal behavior of the crowd: "I
take it that all intelligent and respectable citizens who are cognizant
of the facts agree that it was murder, without one extenuating
circumstance to relieve its atrocious character." 20 5 Still, he maintained
that the evidence did not establish that the sheriff conspired with the
20 6
mob to lynch the prisoner.
Peckham was similarly disinclined to question legislative policy
with respect to Indians. For example, he joined the opinion in Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock (1903), which sustained plenary congressional
authority over tribal lands. 20 7 Still, Peckham voted in several cases for
a rule that ambiguities in Indian treaties should be construed in favor
20
of the Indians.
On the other hand, Peckham demonstrated considerable
sensitivity to Chinese immigrants who faced steadily increasing
restrictions on entry into the United States. In 1882 Congress passed
the Chinese Exclusion Act, which suspended the immigration of

201. 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896); see CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGALHISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 196-98 (1987) (noting that Plessy "embodied conventional
wisdom").
202. Berea Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 57-58 (1908); Cumming v. Richmond County Bd.
of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 544-45 (1899).
203. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1903); Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 225
(1898).
204. 214 U.S. 386, 419-20 (1909). For an analysis of the Shipp case, which gives brief
attention to Peckham's role, see MARK CURRIDEN & LEROY PHILLIPS, JR., CONTEMPT OF COURT:
THE TURN-OF-THE CENTURY LYNCHING THAT LAUNCHED 100 YEARS OF FEDERALISM 169-336

(2001).
205.
206.
207.
208.
(1899).

Shipp, 214 U.S. at 426.
Id. at 430-38.
187 U.S. 553, 564 (1903).
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1908); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 32
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Chinese laborers for ten years. 20 9 Other Chinese citizens, such as
officials, students, and merchants, were exempt from this ban and
2 10
allowed to enter with a certificate as to their occupation.
Subsequent legislation tightened the regulations to halt evasion of the
ban on laborers and vested immigration officials with broad discretion
to determine the status of Chinese aliens. 211 Before Peckham joined
the Supreme Court, the Justices upheld the authority of Congress to
curtail Chinese immigration despite contrary treaty provisions and to
expel Chinese laborers already in the country who could not prove
they were lawful immigrants by obtaining a federal certificate of
212
residence.
In sharp contrast to this record of judicial deference to
congressional and administrative enforcement of racially based
immigration laws, Peckham repeatedly voted to secure the rights of
Chinese immigrants and was among the Justices most sympathetic to
their plight. 213 For example, he sided with the Court majority in
holding that children born in the United States of Chinese parents
were citizens of the United States. 2 14 In addition, Peckham joined
Justice Brewer in vigorous dissents when the Court denied judicial
review to administrative determinations of the right to enter the
2 15
country.
In United States v. Gue Lim (1900), Peckham, speaking for a
unanimous Court, held that the wife and minor children of a Chinese
merchant residing in the United States were entitled to enter without
certificates. 2 16 Rejecting a literal reading of the exclusion laws, he

209. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, amended by Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23
Stat. 115.
210. Id.
211. Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25; Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 47, 25 Stat. 47; Act of July
5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115.
212. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 738 (1893); Chinese Exclusion Cases, 130
U.S. 581, 610-11 (1889).
213. See Gabriel J. Chin, The First Justice Harlan by the Numbers: Just How Great Was
"The Great Dissenter?", 32 AKRON L. REV. 629, 652-55 (1999) (finding that Peckham's voting
record in cases involving Chinese litigants ranked him at the top of Justices in supporting rights
for Chinese immigrants).
214. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898).
215. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 264-80 (1905) (Brewer & Peckham, JJ.,
dissenting); United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161, 170-82 (1904) (Brewer & Peckham, JJ.,
dissenting); see also John E. SEMONCHE, CHARTING THE FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS

To A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1890-1920, at 234 (1978) (observing that "in cases dealing with
Chinese persons [Peckham] often dissented from the Court's tendency to rubber stamp
administrative procedures").
216. 176 U.S. 459, 468-69 (1900); see LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH As TIGERS: CHINESE
IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW

43 (1995) ("If the Chinese
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reasoned that the certificate requirements were aimed at laborers and
were not intended to exclude the wife or minor children of a merchant
lawfully residing in the country. 217 Since a wife and children did not
qualify for a certificate in their own right, Peckham implicitly linked
their status to that of the merchant who was exempt from the
exclusion laws. Peckham's opinion flew in the face of the statutory
language-there was no provision for wives and minor children-but
he struck a blow for family unity. Moreover, in the words of one
scholar, his "decision proved a beachhead for subsequent Chinese
husbands to argue for their rights as men in American society." 218 In
decisions such as Gue Lim, Peckham's commitment to individual
liberty was again evident. Historians generally have not adequately
recognized Peckham's willingness to attack discriminatory treatment
of Chinese immigrants.
Review of state criminal proceedings did not bulk large in the
work of the Fuller Court. The central reason for this was the Court's
refusal to apply the procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights to state
criminal proceedings. Instead, the Justices permitted the states great
leeway over the conduct of criminal trials. 219 This view was
exemplified by Peckham's opinion in Maxwell v. Dow (1900).220 In
Dow, a criminal challenged his conviction for robbery because it was
based on an information rather than indictment by a grand jury and
because he was tried by an eight-person jury instead of the common
law jury of twelve. Brushing aside these arguments, Peckham adhered
to the established position that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment did not necessarily include all the rights
protected by the Bill of Rights against the federal government.
Accordingly, neither a conviction based on an information nor a trial
before a jury of only eight members abridged the defendant's
privileges and immunities. Peckham also insisted that trial by jury
was not a requisite element of due process guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Rather, the states could decide for
themselves the form of procedure in criminal trials. Evincing his

exclusion laws exempted the husband, the wife and child could also enter upon showing that
they were the family of the exempt Chinese.").
217. Gue Lim, 176 U.S. at 464-68.
218. Todd Stevens, Tender Ties: Husbands'Rightsand Racial Exclusion in Chinese Marriage
Cases, 1882-1924, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 271, 286 (2002).
219. ELY, supra note 6, at 165-68; see also William F. Duker, The Fuller Court and State
Criminal Process: Threshold of Modern Limitations on Government, 1980 BYU L. REV. 275, 275
(1980) (stating that in the area of "criminal cases coming from the state courts" the Fuller Court
was "a model of self-restraint").
220. 176 U.S. 581, 616-17 (1900).
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confidence in state administration of criminal justice, Peckham stated
that "there can be no just fear that the liberties of the citizen will not
be carefully protected by the States respectively. It is a case of selfprotection, and the people can be trusted to look out and care for
221
themselves."
XIV. PECKHAM'S LEGACY
It remains to briefly assess Peckham's jurisprudence and to
consider his legacy. The central tenet of Peckham's constitutionalism
was a deep attachment to liberty, a concept that he defined largely in
terms of economic freedom and limited government. He therefore
sought to protect the rights of property owners and the autonomous
role of the states within the federal system. Conversely, Peckham was
hostile to what he perceived as class legislation and schemes to
redistribute wealth. As Hovenkamp explains, conservative jurists like
Peckham "perceived the new interventionist politics of the Progressive
Era as the greatest threat to liberty." 222 To Peckham, liberty clearly
trumped equality as a constitutional norm. In general terms, he
echoed the attitudes of the Framers of the Constitution, who closely
223
linked respect for property rights with liberty.
Like most of the other Justices on the Fuller Court, Peckham
was not shy about invoking judicial review to safeguard economic
rights. In general, he certainly did not defer to legislative judgments.
On the contrary, as John E. Semonche notes, Peckham was a "believer
in the need for an active Court sensitive to the task of guarding
property and contractual rights."224 Peckham's libertarian inclinations
led him to reject the nascent doctrine of judicial deference promoted by
Progressives of the early twentieth century in order to encourage the
emerging regulatory state.
Peckham does not fit the cartoonist image fashioned by the
Progressive historians and their progeny of a one-sided champion of
large-scale business interests. To be sure, the business community
221. Id. at 605.
222. HOVENKAMP, supra note 79, at 77.

223. Walter Dellinger, The Indivisibility of Economic Rights and Personal Liberty, 2003-04
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 9, 19 ("Economic rights, property rights, and personal rights have been
joined, appropriately, since the time of the founding."). Not until the mid-twentieth century did
judges and commentators differentiate civil liberties from economic rights. See Stephen A. Siegel,
Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 33
n.154 (1991) ("Civil liberties encompass both personal and property rights. Indeed, in
nineteenth-century America, property was considered among the most important civil
liberties.").
224. SEMONCHE, supra note 215, at 234.
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may have benefited incidentally from the course of Peckham's
decisions, but such a result was not his primary goal. Instead,
Peckham's
concern
was
to
protect
small,
self-sufficient
entrepreneurs-the "small dealers and worthy men"-from both
excessive governmental regulation and exploitation by concentrated
private power. 225 He indulged no presumption about the legitimacy of
legislation that seemed to abridge marketplace rights. In these
situations, Peckham expected lawmakers to show that regulation
served traditional police power ends of public health, safety, and
morals. In his mind, legislative assertions that regulation was
necessary could not be taken as final because lawmakers could then
circumvent constitutional limits and effectively destroy private
property and contractual freedom in the guise of asserting the police
power.
For all his devotion to economic liberty, Peckham was not a
226
legal theorist or a doctrinaire adherent of laissez-faire principles.
He was prepared to uphold measures safeguarding public health and
safety. He was also receptive to early land use controls and, within
bounds, the exercise of eminent domain. Further, he wrote the first
important opinions applying the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and favored
a strict interpretation of the law.
An evaluation of the influence and lasting significance of
Peckham's jurisprudence must proceed with care. Undoubtedly, he
was a stalwart member of the Fuller Court and authored a number of
leading opinions. But, as frequent dissents demonstrate, he did not
intellectually dominate his colleagues. Consider his signature
issue-the liberty of contract. Peckham was never able to secure a
consistent majority to strike down statutes infringing on contractual
freedom. His record of success in this area was decidedly mixed.
It is unclear how much of Peckham's legal philosophy retains
any vitality in the modern age. His historical reputation is inevitably
tied to the constitutional values of the late nineteenth century. For
better or worse, our nation has moved far from a constitutional order
grounded on a limited national government, states' rights, and a high
regard for the rights of property owners and private market ordering.

225. KELLER, supra note 196, at 367-68.
226. Lawrence M. Friedman has aptly characterized Peckham's generation of jurists: "In
short, the justices, and judges in general, were cautious and incremental. They did not
consistently adhere to any economic philosophy. They simply reacted in the way that respectable,
moderate conservatives of their day would naturally react." FRIEDMAN, supra note 74, at 24; see
also Mayer, supra note 73, at 265 ("Peckham's opinion for the Court [in Lochner] was not based,
either explicitly or implicitly, upon Herbert Spencer's Social Statics or any other laissez-faire
work, still less upon any particular 'economic theory.' ").
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The Progressive critique of constitutionalized property in the early
years of the twentieth century came to fruition with the statist
liberalism of the New Deal and the rise of activist government. 227 To
legitimatize New Deal constitutionalism, many scholars disparaged
both the decisions and the jurists of the Fuller era. 228 They took
229
particular aim at Lochner and Peckham.
One dubious (but popular) thesis is that jurists of Peckham's
age adhered to a mechanistic conception of law and decided cases
without regards to policy considerations. 230 This notion of legal
formalism was promoted by critics of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
and it was largely motivated by political concerns. 23 1 Even a glance at
Peckham's opinions makes it evident that he was not engaged in
abstract deduction from legal principles and precedents. Instead,
Peckham championed what he regarded as socially desirable outcomes
in defense of property rights and contractual freedom. Peckham
cannot fairly be described as a legal formalist.
Rather than accept Peckham's judicial decisions as a principled
expression of his legal beliefs, scholars steeped in Progressive ideology
have too often attributed to him dark motives. We are still frequently
told that the Supreme Court of the Fuller era was simply defending
big business or protecting economic privilege. 23 2 I submit that this
interpretation is wide of the mark and obscures rather than

227. Paul, supra note 9, at 569 ("The statist ideologies of the Progressives and then of the
New Dealers were at odds with the founders' strongly held individualism and belief in the
centrality of property rights.").
228. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE
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Deal.").
229. Id. at 158 (pointing out that the Progressive focus on the supposed rise of substantive
due process was "designed to delegitimate the Lochner court by arguing that it had taken a
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230. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 288 (3d ed. 2005); HALL &
KARSTEN, supra note 83, at 243-44. But see ELY, supra note 6, at 72-75 (asserting that Justices
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232. E.g., ARTHUR S. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN CAPITALISM 60-61 (1968);
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(1988).
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illuminates Peckham's constitutional philosophy. Historians could
more profitably address different questions.
For instance, should Peckham's judicial career be best
understood as a sincere if ultimately futile rear guard action in
defense of a world that was vanishing? Or are other perspectives more
compelling? To the extent that private property and economic freedom
continue to play a role in the American polity, Peckham cannot be
simply erased from constitutional dialogue. Indeed, one might even
argue that the current debate over Lochner and the scope of due
process underscores the continuing significance of Peckham. David
Bernstein forcefully argues that discussion over the extent to which
due process protects unenumerated rights "is a testament to the
ultimate triumph of Peckham's vision of the due process clause as a
source of the Court's power to act as defender of last resort of
individual liberties against the states, if not of his specific views on
the scope of that clause." 233 In short, so long as courts persist in a
substantive reading of the due process guarantee-a propensity that
shows no sign of abating-it is impossible to escape the legacy of
Rufus W. Peckham.

233. Bernstein, supra note 94, at 1525.

